

Ref.: GC/GR 103

Paris Jan 17, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

My despatches are confined to one subject and they are all in the same strain - the ~~Fact~~ fact is that Belgium at this moment so overpowers in interest every other question that it is almost impossible to get either K. or Minister or private individual to listen to any thing which has not reference to it.

You seem to be scarcely aware of the difficulties with which the Gov. here is beset - and how much the difficulties are increased by the countenance which the conference has given to this last demonstration of the P. of O.. The news of it unfortunately came at a moment when the K. was annoyed, and his minister irritated by the attacks of Gen. Lamarque and Mangar in the chamber of deputies; these leaders of the war party, backed as they are by Lafayette upon a question calculated to flatter the vanity and excite the feeling of this vain and susceptible nation, are formidable antagonists to a Gov. which rests on so solid a foundation. It may be true that the majority of the people wish for the continuance of peace, but you know how easily a quiescent majority are overcome by a minority of turbulent spirits. I fear that this latter class look to Belgium as a lever by which they will raise themselves to power, but, whether they succeed or fail in that object my hope of keeping Belgium out of the hands of France will still be very faint. What will you do, if a French partizan force under Fabrie, or other adherents of LaFayette crosses the frontier to assist the French party against the insurgents? You might direct me to remonstrate, but the Gov. would not venture to promise satisfaction nor if they did would they have the power to perform this promise.

Pray tell me what has Tallegrand been doing in these latter conferences? You tell me in your letter that you have authorized Bagot to express to the K. the great anxiety of all the 5 powers that an arrangement which holds not by far the best chance of preserving the peace of Europe may receive his concurrence; Tallegrand then has allowed himself to be a party in giving this authority; and yet Seb. pretends that his ambassador has not been counselled.

I had begun to be very wary about Holland and I am not happy to hear from you that the state of things in that country is improved. If we are to have a rebellion at all, it would be well that the crisis should arrive before a general war on the continent shall have begun, which I fear is not an impossible or distant event.

Nothing can be more reasonable than Seb.'s language about the Polish revolution..... etc..

Granville

Ref.: GC/GR 104

Paris, Jan 19, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I know not whether the secret and confidential despatch of Mr. Percy is worth the expense of a special messenger from Berne, but as the regular Paris courier does not go till Friday, I thought I would avail myself of the opportunity to tell you what has passed between Seb. and myself this morning about M. de Celles and Belgium.

I still hope and believe that both the K. and Seb. wish to avoid war, at least for the present, and I was the more pleased with the specific and mild tone of Seb. this morning, because I know, he had yesterday, (indeed he acknowledged it) an hour conversation with La Fayette, whom he considers to be so much the leader of the Propagandists as to express his persuasion that the revolutionists can do nothing in foreign countries without his knowledge and sanction. Seb. expressed great interest in the conservation of tranquillity in Ireland..... etc.

Ref.: GC/GR 105

Paris, Jan 21, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

Your despatch No. 12 contains such a complete refutation of Seb.'s charge that I had great pleasure in reading it to him.

I have however my suspicions that Tallegrand has been playing rather a double game; I know he represents that in this question of the P. of O. you and Lord Grey are both led astray by the influence of Madame de Lieven, and these representations I think tended to confirm the impression which had been given by Bresson's report of Lord Ponsonby's language as to the inconvenyance afforded to the Orangist party.

I agreed with Seb. that no good now could be done by calling for explanations, the effect of which might be to make a quarrel between Bresson and Lord Ponsonby.

There was however one point on which Seb. had better foundation for what he said, than could have been imagined by you; he was justified in saying that the emperor of Austria was not favourable to the election of the P. of O. or of any of his family. - I enclose a copy of the words which Marshal Maison quotes as being addressed to him by the emp. - I saw the original despatch, and when I observed that it did not appear that the protestantism of the Nassau family had been a ground of objection, he immediately called for another despatch of Marshal Maison, in which that objection was said to have been specifically stated by his Imp. Majesty.

Seb. told me that he was so anxious to remove from your mind any feeling of an unpleasant nature between yourself and him, - he should write to you a letter expressive of his great regard and highest opinion of you.

I had written thus far before dinner; I have in a public despatch tonight told you of my visit to the Palais Royale. The uneasiness of the K. is extreme, and it seemed he desired his position, particularly after his positive declaration that he would never acknowledge the Duke of Leuchtenberg as K. of Belgium, would in the case of the P. being elected be most embarrassing.

I shall not fail to pay attention to his Majesty's commands relative to the army and the navy of France, but having so very short a time here, I am not as yet aware of the channel through which I shall be able to obtain the details which his Majesty expects.

The courier says he shall be too late for the tide if he is delayed, so I must leave off.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 106

Paris, Jan 7, Saturday, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

After all, I omitted to enclose the extract from Marshal Maison's despatch, and I believe I forgot to say to you that it was given to me by Seb. on condition it should not be shown to Esterhazi or Wesenberg.

Seb. was very anxious that I should on writing to you confirm the statements which Flahant is directed to make to the embarrassment which is felt by the Gov. and by the K., in consequence of the expectation of their friends, that France should regain possession of the frontier she had before the revolution. It is perfectly true, that the Bonapartists and the republicans feel sure that after many years of triumph, the final result has been a diminution of territory and a restless spirit will be constantly agitating the public mind until an attempt is made to recover not only their ancient boundaries, but what they call their natural limits. I doubt that the concession of what Seb. is now aiming at would relieve the K. from the embarrassment he now feels; if we do not make our hand upon the frontier by which all the powers are bound to the late ~~esidities~~(?), the Mauritius may be claimed from us, upon the same principle that Phillipote and co. may be demanded on the continental frontier.

Pozzo di Bargo has been this morning with Seb. who has also hinted to him how much the preservation of the general peace would be facilitated by the restoration to France of these places. Pozzo writes to Lieven by this courier to urge you to be firm in setting aside this proposition, and I see there is a letter par Appoui also which is ~~En~~ *an* affaire written to Esterhazi for the same purpose. I am going to an early dinner at Seb's, and I am this moment told I shall be too late, if I add another word. There is a ball of 6000 persons this evening at the opera, at which the K. will be found.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 107

Paris, Jan 24, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

We are obliged to go to a very early ball at the Palais Rozyale, and I now find that the hour of dinner is arrived without my having had time to write a single line to you in answer to your very satisfactory private letter. But I must thank you ~~first~~ for it, and express my great satisfaction at Tallegrand's name being affixed to the protocol of the 21st. The communications between London and Paris are so rapid, that it is difficult to discover on which side the water these proposals for robbing the Belgians of their territory originate; nor am I quite sure that the disposition lately manifested by some of the moderate members of the chamber to extend their frontier may not have been encouraged by the ministers with the view of justifying their making proposals to us, so very inconsistent, with their former proposals of moderation, as well as with the obligations of the (—) by which they ~~acknowledged~~ themselves to be bound. This election of the Duc de Leuchtenberg is indeed a most embarrassing affair for the K. He is positively committed not to recognize him, but I doubt whether the people here, even the moderate people who wish for peace, will uphold him in rejecting all commercial and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Seb. could of course retire, but I doubt whether Louis Philippe's throne might not be placed in jeopardy. When Seb. threw himself upon me so much for advice, I could not I think do otherwise than send off the despatches to put you in the earliest possession of his distress, and of his wish to be helped, though he was desirous to be enabled to say he had not asked for assistance.

Is it not amusing to use Rome's name among the conspirators pointed out by the prefect of police as about to set off to join their friends Mess. Ebbot and Hunt in England.

Granville.

I dined yesterday with LeFilte and was surprised to find that the late ministers such as M. Braylier and others who were there appeared to be upon the most amiable footing with those now in power.

Ref.: GC/GR 108

Paris, Jan 28, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

I received your private letter of the 25th last night. I was disappointed not to find in it a single word on the subject of Flahant's allusion(?). I had hoped to have heard from you, whether you had helped to defeat the nomination of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, or whether Flahant was satisfied with the assistance you had given. The K. said last night that you had consented to the election of the Prince of Naples; but Seb. told me this morning that you were only inclined to waive your objection to him, but that your Russian plenipotentiaries in the conference were limited to the P. of O..

Seb. was not in good humour this day; he is easily put out of temper. He is discouraged by slight obstacles; on Wednesday when I met him for dinner at Rothschild's he was so downcast with the expectation of the attack on him the next day in the chamber of deputies, that he had thoughts of resigning, and I believe talked of it to the K.. His ill humour seems to have been caused today by a report, which he had received (not he said from Bresson) of a conversation between certain Belgians and Lord Ponsonby; these Belgians asked what England would do, if the congress elected the Duc de Nemours; La Guerre was Lord P.'s answer - La guerre, repeated Seb., c'est un gros mot! They then asked what would happen if the Duc de Nemours ~~was chosen~~ Leuchtenberg was chosen; Lord P. answered that France may resent it, but knew not what the other powers may do. Upon my return home from the Foreign Office I found a letter from Brussels which gives the lie to this dialogue; for, Abercrombie in a letter of the 26th says "we have done everything to be (—) the Duc de Leuchtenberg and it is possible that he may be rejected.". I begin to doubt the sincerity of Seb.'s wishes for peace, and even the K.'s, that is, I doubt whether the latter would risk the loss of his popularity with the decision that in order to preserve it (—) the K. said to Pozzo di Borgo last night, that it would be necessary to send French troops into Belgium to put an end to the anarchy and exact more deference to the great powers of Europe. Pozzo replied that his Majesty he was sure would not think of acting singly, and that if such an object was to be effected it must be done by the 5 powers conjointly.

10 o'clock PM:-

I am this moment come home from a great dinner at Pozzo's. Seb. had recovered his spirits and good humour; he acknowledged to me that the chamber responded most satisfactorily to the pacifist tone of the ministry. The K. had insisted upon Soult speaking in favour of peace, and he did it in a manner completely to satisfy Seb. and other colleagues. I think that for some time we shall hear no explosion, but I like not this new levy of 80,000 men. They say they are only to be ballotted for, and not called into actual service; this additional force will raise the army to about 400,000 men; I believe the account given in one of Goldsmith's enclosures is tol-

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erably correct. I am trying to get an authentic statement, much as his Majesty wished to have transmitted. With regard to the navy it seems that the consuls have been directed to send them information to the Board of Admiralty.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 109

Paris, Jan 31, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Seb. was not very well pleased with Tallegrand for signing the protocol of the 20th, which (dissatend?) the principal object of Flahant's mission in London. He however sanctioned Tallegrand's signature; he made(?) and in his speech in the chamber of deputies, of the neutrality stipulated for Belgium, and had become satisfied and in good humour, but when I communicated to him this morning confidentially the protocol of the 27th he could not repair from exclaiming 'mais comment done ? Sans instructions signer ce protocol ? Ces Belges n'y conestiront jamais - and I have my apprehensions that he intends to get the K. to disavow the act of his ambassador. I still however have the opportunity of telling to his Majesty on the subject at a ball at the Palais Royale.

It is unpurgary that the telegraph has not yet ~~announced~~ announced the result of the deliberations of the Brussels congress. The K. is in a state of very great anxiety, and no endeavours have been spent to obtain the election of the Duc de Nemours; I believe the report to be true that the shops were searched by people from the Palais Royale, (—) of the Duc de Nemours to send to Brussels when Bresson last returned there.

I did not tell this morning to Seb. of P. Charles of Bavaria, for the prejudice against him here is so strong, that I am quite sure it would be useless to attempt to persuade either the K. or his minister to agree to the choice.

I really believe that this young P. of Naples affords the only chance of bringing the matter to an amicable settlement; I hope I did not say too much to Seb. when I admitted the possibility of the English Gov. according to his nomination, but it is impossible not to feel strongly the necessity of this Belgian question being settled somehow, when one sees the degree to which the feeling of the French people is excited upon the subject, and although we cannot admit the pressure of a violent party to be a justification for the French Gov. to violate its engagements, yet I am sure it is good policy to give the K. a helping hand against the Marquvais(?) and le Marquvais, when we can do so, without the sacrifice of any essential interests.

Seb. gave me to read this morning the letter of Id. Ponsonby to M. Bresson dated 25th in which he informs him that in answer to an enquiry for the Belgians as to what would be the consequence of electing the Duc de Nemours, he had said war, and that in answer to a second enquiry as to what would be the consequence of electing the Duc de Leuchtenberg, he had implied probably war, as the French were entirely opposed to that election, Seb. complained of the bias thus given in favour of the latter, and intimated that this unveiled declaration had an air of menace which had better have been avoided. I said that perhaps some diplomats might have employed a (—) phrase to express to the Belgians that the powers of Europe would

Ref.: GC/GR 109 (continued)

not consent to the Duc de Nemours being the sovereign of Belgium, but it was certainly desirable that there should be no misunderstanding as to the facts; and I observed that it was better for M. Bresson than Ld. Pons. to give a positive answer to the question as to what could be the consequence of the Duc de Leuchtenberg being elected.

With regard to the naval armaments, Seb. said that Tallegrand had written satisfactorily and he rather interrupted my entering upon that question. I believe that the fitting out of some ships at Toulon was ordered some little time ago, when reports reached Paris of the whole Russian fleet in the black sea being prepared for service. The K. questioned me one evening as to the truth of these reports, but added if England and France are upon a good understanding, we need not be afraid of the naval preparations of any other power.

Three early balls at the ~~Grand~~ Palais Royal on Sunday are inconvenient on Port days. I am now obliged in consequence to add no more to this letter.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 110

Paris, Jan 31, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

As you desire to have the enclosed returned to you, I send it in a private letter. It was given me on the condition that it should on no account be made public, and Seb. required me to request you to burn it as soon as you have read it. You see therefore that I am precluded from transmitting it in an official despatch. -

I think I mentioned to you that Seb. offered to send another despatch of Maison's in which the objection made by the emperor to the P. of O. was his being a protestant, but I did not like to appear to doubt his word and therefore begged him not to take that trouble. You would have been little pleased perhaps, if I had not trusted to his assertion.

Note:-

Vienna, Jan 4, 1831.

Je rappelai alors à l'Empereur que notre Cabinet avait donné la meilleure Prince qui pour sa part il p---(?) (erased in part) tout à fait ses sentiments en faisant des démarches en faveur du Prince d'Orange et (futur) en travaillant les intérêts de son fils.

Je le sais répondit sa Majesté mais le P. d'O. qui le bat bien à fort mal dirigé ses affaires en cette circonstance. Peut être le P. à part son mérite, un champ de bataille, seroit-il le moins bon choix qu'on fut faire. Je n'assouverais pas d'avantage le place qui tendroit à porter son fils un trône, une régence servit faible dans l'état où est la Belgique.

Ref.: GC/GR 112

Paris, Feb 2, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

The assurances I have contrived to receive both from the K. personally as well as from Count Seb. of his Majesty's adhesion to his determination not to accept the offer of the Belgian crown for the Duc. de Nemours are most satisfactory.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 113

Paris, Feb 4, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Never was a change of tone, of temper and of language so rapid as that which took place today in the case of Seb.. You will see by my report of what he said to me at one o'clock today that he was warm, warlike and mounted on his light horse. At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 he comes into my room to announce the telegraph communication of the election of the Duc de Nemours and in a meek, subdued, but most friendly tone to inform me of the K.'s positive refusal, and begs me to obliterate all mention on the subject of the protocol. He expressed a wish to act cordially with the other powers and the conference, but what he expressed with most earnestness was his desire that the confidence between us should be unbounded; tell Lord Palmerston, he said, that we will not have a thought concealed from him, and that I look to his acting towards us with the same frankness.

I have not time for another line; I have an arrangement to dinner, and at a $\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 I am to receive the Duc de Orleans who comes tonight to a ball given by Lady Granville.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 114

Paris, Feb 7, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I like not this delay in the K.'s receiving publicly the deputation from Brussels, and my mind will not be quite at ease, until his Majesty has officially and formally ~~declared~~ to them that he will not permit his son to accept the crown. I admit that the delay rests upon plausible reasons; it is certainly desirable to communicate with these ten members of the deputation, who are I understand for the most part persons of influence and consideration in the congress, on the means of substituting in the place of the French Prince some other candidate who would be recognized by the great powers of Europe, and when the deputation has once received the K.'s refusal it would have no pretence to prolong its stay in Paris. It would of course be expected to render at Brussels account of the mission, but I cannot entirely divest myself of the apprehension, notwithstanding the declarations both of the K. and his minister that the intrigues of M. de Celles, of M. de Lavoteire and others may overcome his Minister's firmness, and if upon sounding the members of the deputation, a decided repugnance should be shown to the nomination of the P. of Naples, and no other choice be suggested agreeable to France, I should not be surprised, if another effort were made to obtain the consent of England to the acceptance of the crown by the Duc de Nemours. The agents of France (but of this Lord Ponsonby probably gives you more precise information) have encouraged the Belgians to believe that Louis Philippe would not refuse the offer for his son; M. de Celles has I believe been most active in confirming this impression, and as he was known to be this morning and evening at the Palais Royale, it is not surprising that his communications should have been considered as entitled to (endit?). I heard last night that when the members of the deputations who arrived yesterday were informed of the K.'s intention to refuse their offer, they expressed great indignation at the deception practised upon them by M. de Celles. You will of course approve of my meeting these Belgian deputies at dinner, you may rely upon my discretion, being aware that whatever I say, will probably be published and commented upon in the Brussels congress.

Pozzo and Werther are both very angry at Seb.'s letter to Bresson respecting the limits; they seem disposed to maintain that every thing which issues from the conference is a law which the Belgians, and Dutch have nothing to do with, but to obey. Seb. on the contrary asserts that their decisions are nothing more than projects, which are of no force unless consented to by the parties whom they concern. Could it not be well that this difference of opinion should be considered in the conference.

On wednesday I am told that Belgium politics are to be brought forward in the chamber of deputies. On that night, or on Thursday I shall probably send back the spare messengers who arrived here on Saturday.
Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 115

Paris, Feb 7, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

An old correspondent has renewed his communication and I enclose a copy of what he sent to me this morning. You will I think read with interest ~~with~~ his account of this Belgian intrigue - I believe that there is a great deal of truth in what he writes, and I acknowledge that since I read it, my apprehensions of a retraction of the K.'s refusal have somewhat increased.

Granville.

Jane, 12, 1831

Sur l'intrigue nouée entre les chefs du parti catholique en Irlande et ceux du même parti en Belgique.

Peu après son élection au parlement par le comté de Clare, Daniel O'Connell endoyen ~~à Bruxelles~~ son frère à Bruxelles. Il arriva ici il y a environ deux ans et logea à l'hôtel de Belle-Vue; il eut de fréquentes conférences avec M. de Rubiano de Borsbeck et lui donna des cordes ~~ventes~~ à distribuer.

Celui-ci fit bientôt insérer dans un ouvrage se lui - périodique ^(*) rédigé par la faction ultramontaine franco-belge un long article sur cette élection.

Il était précédé d'une lettre - gens de bien, signée de Rob. de Borsbeck le mars 1829 commençant par ces mots: Le nous décourageons point ce que nous n'obtiendrons pas actuellement, il dépend de nous de l'obtenir un jour mais d'abord jugeons bien notre position.

L'auteur cite ses prétendus gens de bien à n'entendre à aucune composition avec le gouvernement. Vous avons appris à nous plaindre tout tout haut au lieu de gémir(?) tout bas.

Plus loin il arrive à son cher O'Connell et continue ainsi: pour animer le zèle, si éminemment national, l'élan catholique et à jamais mémorable (??) nous n'avons n'en vu de plus opportune que de publier la relation de la victoire remportée récemment par la persévérance irlandaise dans l'élection de M. O'Connell.

Le frère a vu - Malines les vicaires généraux de feu l'archevêque Stercks, et Collier, apostoliques renforcés: il s'est sans doute concerté avec eux sur les moyens de sarlever les deux pays: Ils n'ont que trop réussi en Belgique.

(*) Il paraît sous le nom de Bibliothèque Catholique de la Belgique, par Cahiers détachés formant un gros volume chaque année. L'article ici mentionné se trouve au cahier No. 2 par 1829.

Ref.: GC/GR 116

Paris, Feb 9, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Pozzo di Borgo has for some days been showing particular impressions to converse with me; his object seems to be to convince me that Seb. is not to be believed; that the K. from his wish to be well with all parties, is not to be relied upon; that war is inevitable; that all the powers of Europe should without delay, by establishing a contact between them, be prepared to resist the attack of the French. Seb. on the other hand professes the greatest friendship for me, talks to me of his personal regard for you; says that the irritation he had shown occasionally proceeded from his feelings being hurt at your having entertained suspicions of his having deviated from the straight forward cause, warns me against the intentions of Russian diplomats both here in London, who have received (—?) ministers and instructions he says to allow England into a war with Russia against France, and he desired me to say to you confidentially that the French Gov. were ready to enter into a treaty with out cabinet; he whispered this to me as I left his room this evening, and I cannot tell you what is the object of his proposed treaty.—

The Belgian, Seb. says, have ~~fully~~ today seemed disposed to admit the practicality of electing P. Charles of Naples, but I suspect that the French Gov. will notwithstanding this adhere to the protocol of the 20th January, strenuously support this pretension of the Belgians to extend their limits. — One of the Gov. argued with me here last night that as the States Gen. were made up of 55 Dutch members, and 55 Belgians, and that among the latter posed Lux. elected members, the Lux. country must be considered as appertaining to Belgium. What do you propose to do with the fortresses? If we agree to recognize Charles of Naples, we may of course make our conditions as to razing, or demantling them, should the doing so be deemed expedient.

The new pope is considered here to be a liberal, reasonable man..

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 117

Paris, Feb 11, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

Flahant returned here yesterday. He has come from England with good and useful impressions. He asserts that we have been straight forward, and that we wish for peace, if France will abstain from aggression. He evidently thinks though he does not exactly say it, that his friends here, in their disavowal of Tallegrand in their intrigues to defeat Leuchtenberg, and procure the election of Nemours, have acted unfairly by their own ambassador, not very honourably towards us, and most unwisely for themselves.

I fear that the united efforts of the 4 powers will not obtain the non-avenue (?) - we may expose Seb., we may even shame him out of the Foreign Dept., but I doubt our gaining by the change. He has, it is true, made himself to a certain degree the instrument of the intriguers who infest the Palais Royale, but notwithstanding his varillations, notwithstanding his transitions from one state of temper to another, should we be better off with such a man as Bresson who is to the backbone anti-English, and who would most probably be Seb.'s successor? We seem to be as far removed as ever from the settlement of the Belgish question. The Palais Royale are so intent upon putting the P. of Naples upon the throne, that there is nothing that they will not promise to induce the Belgians to elect him. They will engage that an Orleans Princess shall be his wife, they will notwithstanding the protocol of the 20th Jan. promise to support the Belgians in their demand of Lux., Limburgh and the left bank of the Scheldt, and Maestricht.

A courier from Brussels despatched yesterday by Ponsonby arrived here this evening. He brought to me the answer to his note presenting the protocol No. 15 of the 7 of Feb. The refusal of the committee to receive this communication shows both too plainly that the conduct of this Gov. in disavowing the acts of its plenip. in London has had the effect of encouraging the Belgians to lay aside all deference to the conferences of the 5 powers. I shall in my conversation with Seb. tomorrow show up this refusal, as one of the points of his letters of the 1st of Feb..

You will see by the memo. I enclosed in my despatch what we ambassadors agreed to say to Seb.. We were between 2 or 3 hours talking it over, for I felt it to be necessary to guard against the use of expressions, which might seem to countenance the doctrines of the Holy Alliance, and militate against our non-intervention principle. Pozzo appears to wish to commit us in a quarrel with France. My other colleagues are inclined I think to be much more pacifick - this is not surprising; Austria and Prussia would have to sustain the brunt of the first onset, whilest Russia from its distance from the scene of action might remain quiet, until it suited her convenience to take her shre in the war.

I will attend to your wishes respecting Oselia(?) but it is very difficult to turn ones mind from this to any other question.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 118

Paris, Feb 12, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I did not expect to gain more than we have done by our remonstrance to Seb. upon his letter to Bresson. He gave me to understand that it was the K. and the council who ordered him to write it, and that he was an unwilling instrument in their hands. He parted today in perfect good humour.

He told me that he had told the deputation, if they could find any K. who would be more agreeable to him than the P. of Naples, the French Gov. did not wish to press that nomination, in that should they even determine upon a republick, though there might arise from it inconvenience to the Royal Gov. here, it would not be objected.

I have taken upon myself to give leave to Craddock to go to England on Monday to attend his parliamentary duty. His going will be rather a loss to me, but I hope he will be a steady voter with you. Stuart is staying here to avoid committing himself by a vote on either side.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 119

Paris, Feb. 14, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I have just heard that Seb. has told La Fayette, that if the Austrian troops interferred to put down insurrection in any other territory of Italy..... etc.....

Re.: Italy.

Ref.: GC/GR 120

Paris, Feb 10, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

The K.'s answer to the Belgians deputies is I hope sufficiently specific to satisfy your house of common interrogators - and I doubt whether in executing the instructions of which you give me notice I shall be able to obtain any thing more satisfactory from the French Gov. on the object of their armaments.

The K. has in his private communications with the Belgians pressed upon them very strongly the desirableness of their electing the Neapolitan Prince, and I believe they have almost all individually promised to support his nomination. Notwithstanding all the objections to him it is important to get this Belgish question settled soon, that I hope even though he should marry an Orleans princess we shall not make any difficulty acknowledging him. Do you think that the English publick could support you in a quarrel upon this point? If we do go to war we must I think satisfy the country that we are forced into it by a non-observance of positive treaty, or by manifest aggression on the part of France. If the present minority here remains in power, I am sanguine enough to believe, no such cause of war shall be given to us; if the party 'de movement' (?) gain an ascendancy they are so pledged to support insurrection everywhere, it will be no easy matter for us to remain at peace. What is your language to gain diplomatick body on their Italian revolutions? If France and Austria chose to quarrel about supporting insurrection in the pope's dominions, I suppose we shall not make ourselves in any way parties to such quarrel.

The Gov. are so incessantly occupied about the tumults of this week and their internal concerns that Pozzo and myself have in vain endeavoured to get sight of Seb.. I met d'orjant(?) at dinner today; his language is stout, he talked with confidence of the Gov. having it in their power at any moment to put down their republican enemies, but

Ref.: GC/GR 120 (continued)

they wished to do so without firing upon the people. He said that 184 persons had been arrested, and that many of them charged with offences which would subject them to capital punishment.

Seb.'s expression about not allowing the Belgian fortresses to be in the hands of an enemy to France has said in one of those moments of irritation, when, he seems not to be aware of the force of expression of what he makes use. If we wished to pick a quarrel with France, his momentary fits of intemperance might be taken advantage of for that purpose; but I have thought it more advisable not to appear to have understood his meaning, rather than to be asking for explanations which at the moment when he is in one of his ~~fits~~ little passions might lead to an angry discussion, which would put an end to all chance of cordiality and good will in our future communications.

Lord Stuart, you will probably have seen before this letter reaches you. It was certainly very ill judged in him to remain here after my arrival, but I believed that he wished not to commit himself to vote with either party, till their respective strength had been put to the test in parliament~~ary~~, having always the intention of going au secours du plus fort.

Granville.

PS 10 o'clock P.M.

I have just heard that Odillon Barrot is certainly to be the minister of the interior, and M. Rid prefect of police.

Ref.: GC/GR 121

Paris, Feb 21., 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Your despatch No. 28 instructing me to ask for explanation of the French armaments is an admirable paper; it is impossible that Seb. even in his most tricky humour could take offence at it. I hope however that the severe but salutary lesson given to him in your private letter to me of the 29th and which you sent through the French foreign office, will have the effect of making him keep his tempers under control. These fits of violence are occasionally shewn to others as well as to me. Pozzo complains that his patience is frequently put to a severe trial, and the unhappy Rothchild comes to me trembling at Seb.'s declarations of what France will not bring(?) from the other powers; but as I have before said to you, these ebullitions are momentary; they are succeeded by a mild and friendly tone, by an apparent, if not real forgetfulness, of what dropped from him in a moment of irritation. ~~It is~~ not therefore better to avoid getting into an angry squabble, which might embarrass our future communications. I agree with you however that he ought to be checked, and I will adopt a more contentious mode of dealing with him, if his language should again assume in any degree the unturning air of menace. Perhaps the opportunity could occur when I execute your instructions relative to the rumoured promise of a marriage between the P. of Naples and the Orleans Princess. He will I think very likely answer my enquiries by an enloyain(?) or the K. of the French; magnanimity in refusing the crown offered to his son, but that the majority will not be dictated to by any power as to the disposal of his own daughter, and that he will sooner go to war than submit to such dictation. If we encourage Potter and his republicans we might perhaps defeat the candidate set up by France, but if the P. be selected I suppose you would not think it worthwhile to withhold our recognition of him because he is to be married to a French princess.

The more intense interest of domestick politicks so absorbs the minds of all persons now that Belgium for the moment seems almost forgotten, and the Italian revolutionaries are talked of with indifference, but the success of the propogandists abroad but increase this influence and power in France, and I doubt Louis Philipe having the revolution even if he had the power to resist their attacks. I should not be surprised at O. Barrot becoming his efficient minister and La Fayette reinstated in his command of the National Guard, the hereditary peerage, I consider as a lost game, and I see no hope of orderly and good Gov.. The nation is too vain and the people too ambitious to be contented with the enjoyment of peace and tranquility.

Granville.

PS I fear that Seb. though at the chamber all day has deferred his Belgick statement until tomorrow.

Thursday Feb 24 1831.

My dear Palmerston,

I transmit by a special Messenger the accompanying Despatches because it seems to me most desirable that Government should be put in immediate Possession of their Contents. I wish also to apprise you without delay, that the Prince of Naples having been thrown overboard, the King & Sebastiani have recurred to the Project of having Prince Leopold elected King of Belgium & married to an Orleans Princess. The latter in my conversation with him yesterday morning spoke to me so positively of the Intention of the King to propose to the Conference their Sanction of the choice of the Prince of Coburg, & to give him his cordial support, that I immediately wrote to you a publick despatch on the subject, but it was luckily too late for the [?] for having seen the King in the Evening, I learnt from him that he had not as yet communicated to his Council of Ministers his Project, but he should have it that very night brought under their consideration. Today, however, I hear from Count Sebastiani that he had persuaded His Majesty to delay the consideration of the Project by the Council until by private communication their assent to it had been individually obtained, & Sebastiani said to me that he had no doubt of the concurrence of his Colleagues. He attached however great importance to the Intentions of the King not being made known as yet, & requested me not to mention the subject to either Pozzo or Werther, & that I should communicate it to you by private letter: he said to me "c'est la male solution de la question." Recollecting that nearly the last words you said to me before I quitted England were to the same effect, I have not hesitated to express my Belief that such an arrangement would meet with the concurrence of England. But I feel doubtful of the Success of the Scheme; it was abandoned two months ago, because opinions were pronounced against it in the Chamber of Deputies, & the Paris Newspapers called it an Intrigue to place an English Prince on the Throne of Belgium. In a fortnight the Chamber will cease to be assembled for two months, but the Press will not be idle. The King represented to me that the Belgians urged most earnestly that he would give his daughter in marriage to their Sovereign, whatever Prince might be elected. He also talked to me at length about the Belgian Fortresses, contending that the same Policy which induced Joseph 2nd to open all his frontier Towns, ought now to be followed;

GC/GR/122

he tried to prove to me that if they remained they would be more likely in the End to form an additional Rampart for the defence of France than for the defence of Holland. I know not what view you take in this Question, but I own I am inclined to agree in opinion with the King of the French.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

Feb 26th 1851

My dear Palmerston,

My Prediction in my Letter of last night is not quite verified, because it does not appear that Talleyrand will be immediately recalled; but Sebastiani says that he is only deterred from recalling him by his anxiety that there should not be even the appearance of a disagreement between France & England, & that henceforth all communications from him to the English Govt will pass only through me. The official note refusing the King's Ratification of the last Protocol is therefore to be addressed to me, & he says I shall receive it tomorrow Evening, or Monday Morning. I shall therefore transmit it by the ordinary Messenger, & should send Hunter back to you that you may be immediately apprized of the disavowal. You will see by my account of our Conversation that Sebastiani was aware that Talleyrand had received his prohibitory instructions previous to signing the Protocol. His first question to me was, on what day is the Protocol dated? I looked at my Copy, & said the 19th of February; "yes", he replied, "but it was not signed till the 21st & before it was signed Prince Talleyrand, I know, received the Instructions, which I will now read to you", & I must say that nothing can be more positive than the Injunction not to sign any Protocol without previously referring it for consideration here.

6 o'clock

I have this instant been interrupted by Sebastiani calling here to beg me to consider what he said to me respecting not continuing to communicate with you through Talleyrand, as entirely entre nous, & not to be spoken of. He is also very anxious that the most inviolable Secrecy should be observed respecting the Project of placing Prince Leopold on the Belgian Throne; he has not yet divulged it to his Colleagues; he is afraid that through some of them it might reach his Enemies in the Chamber of Deputies. He waits therefore for the Dissolution, which will take place in about a week, & he hopes that before the Chamber meets again the whole project may be brought to maturity. He regretted that I had not cautioned you against mentioning it to Talleyrand, who he says would tell it to the [Duchesse de Dino?], from whom it would get to the Russians & the Prince of Orange. He said, if Pozzo knew it, he would as he had done before, stimulate the French in the Chamber to raise

a cry against it.

I think they do not wish to go to war with Austria about Italy, but they have incautiously pledged themselves to LaFayette & others, & they are afraid of a Clamour being raised against their Timidity & Indecision. I should like to receive from you some hints as to the Language which I shall hold on this Italian question.

I fear that the popularity of the King is decreasing fast, & the stability of the Govt every day becoming more doubtful. The two months which will elapse before the Reassembling of the Chamber will be very critical; there is not a single Man of Energy & decision in the Govt on whom the King can rely. Odilon Barrot is I think likely to play a very conspicuous part, & I am not sure that it would not have been wise to have enlisted him on the side of the King by placing him in high Power.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

The French have fallen here today upon a Report of the Savoyard Refugees having marched into Savoy but Sebastiani says that they have Telegraphick accounts from Lyons this day, which say nothing of it. The French Govt has sent a General Officer to Lyons for the Special Purpose of putting an end to all meetings of the Italian Refugees in the neighbourhood & of sending them individually into the Interior.

P.S.

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 10

I think it better to send you my despatches as I write them, because you will then better understand the successive wavering of the Conduct of the Govt in the management of foreign affairs. This vacillation is inconvenient, but I fear that in the internal Gov of the country there is the same indecision, & the King will find to his cost that France can only be governed by a firm hand. I begin to apprehend that his Reign will not be of long duration, the Bonapartists, the Republicans, the Terrorists & Carlists are all at work against Louis Philippe, & I see that his best Friends & advisers tremble for him.

GC/GR/124

Paris
Feb. 26th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

Sebastiani read to me a part of a despatch from Talleyrand, in which he says, "that Lord Palmerston, having in his hand a despatch from Lord Granville said that the French Government had changed their opinion regarding Lord Ponsonby." Now, I have looked over my despatches, & I can find nothing from which it can be inferred that any change had taken place; if the whole be not an Invention of Talleyrand, & that you said any thing of the Sort, your Inference must have been drawn from my Silence on the subject in my late communications with you.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

Feb 28th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I hope you did not expect that Sebastiani would be in perfect good humour at hearing of [M. Brisson] having displaced his Part of [?] to the London Conference. That Letter of Sebastiani's of the 1st of Febr & the Tricks played to obtain a Majority for the Duc de Nemours over the Duc de Leuchtenberg are points on which he necessarily feels very sore, & when you hit him in the Raw, you cannot be surprised that he should wince & kick a little - he has heard also of Ronsonby's abusing him personally, as well as the French Govt in general, for the deceits practised to induce the Belgians to elect the Duc de Nemours.

I am impatient to know what you think of the reverting to Leopold as a Candidate for the Throne of Belgium. Sebastiani continues to say that it is the only solution of our difficulties. You must also tell me what I am to say about Italy, etc. I am daily assailed by the Nuncio who tremblingly asserts that the Pope being so unprovided with Troops, has a peculiar claim for the Intervention & assistance of his neighbours [?]. Do you think it desirable to keep Talleyrand as ambassador; I have my apprehensions that you will so press his silence on the disavowal of the Protocol, that the King will order him to be recalled. He has certainly acted in direct defiance of his Instructions. How should you feel, if I in the same manner disobeyed you? I should not, I am [?], that such disobedience could be overlooked.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/126

Paris

March 2nd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

M. Philippe, the Hanoverian Charge d'affaires (who I believe to be a very good intelligent man) requested me yesterday to allow him to see the Protocol of the 19th of Feb. I answered him that I did not think myself at liberty to show it to any of my Colleagues, where Govts were not parties to the Conference in London. Let me know whether I did right in refusing, & whether I ought to have been less reserved, in consideration of M. Philippe serving the same Sovereign as myself.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

March 4th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I am much gratified by your Postscript, approving my manner of executing your Instructions. The unsteadiness & Inconsistency of those with whom I have to deal is my greatest difficulty. Opinions & Declarations are on one day, on the impulse of the moment, hazarded, which are retracted the following day, due consideration having been given to the Consequences to which they may lead. Sebastiani however has of late been much more even tempered. I told Flahaut, who is his most intimate friend, that the good understanding between the two Govts might be affected by the use of intemperate, or high Language for that I could not answer for my always keeping my Temper.

I have this instant been interrupted by Count St aulaise, who tells me that he will set off for Rome, the day after tomorrow. He expresses great Regret that we have no Minister at Rome, no agent of any sort, who ^{might} help him in his difficult task. If the Pope, he observed, could be persuaded, that the Austrians would not march to reestablish his authority, & that the Insurgents could be persuaded that the French Nation would not force their Govt to protect them against Austria, it might perhaps not be difficult to make each Party agree to reasonable Terms.

I have promised to write Seymour at Florence to represent to him the good Intentions with which Count St aulaise undertakes his Mission to Rome, & to say that I am convinced the British Govt would view with Pleasure any arrangement which should prevent Austria & France coming into collision on the affairs of Italy; I think I am justified in saying this much, though you have sent me as yet no Instruction respecting Italy. No wonder that Reform absorbs all your attention; it is indeed a question in every Point of view of such immense Importance. I collected from Sebastiani that some of your Corps diplomatique in London, particularly Esterhazi, are very sanguine as to your being all turned out, & succeeded by the D. of Wellington. They rely upon the King not consenting to dissolve Parliament.

The last News from Warsaw is of the 22d at which Time no decisive action had been taken.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/129

Paris
March 7th 1831.

My dear Palmerston,

I entirely concur in your objections to the appointment of Flahaut as ambassador in London, and as it is very probable that in the Case of the Recall of Talleyrand, Flahaut would be proposed as his Successor by Sebastiani, & approved by Louis Philippe, it is certainly better that no change should take place. It was on this account that, when Sebastiani attempted to justify his own conduct upon Talleyrand's Disobedience of his Instructions, I did not say to him, prove the Truth of your justification by not continuing him as the organ of your Government. I think Flahaut is very anxious that the British & French Govts should be good friends, and as he is very intimate with Sebastiani, he may occasionally be here a very useful channel of communication.

I see by the Newspapers that Van der Weyen announces in a speech to the Congress that the Envoys would be sent to make the requisite communications; I suppose that from him you will learn in whose Name [Chaquin de ?] is Regent, and whether his appointment supercedes the Election of the Duc de Nemours. Sebastiani continues to assure me in a whispering confidential Tone that he is quietly working for Leopold of Coburgh.

I have just heard that your Reform Bill has been thrown out by a majority of 67, and you may easily conceive that I am most impatient to know, whether you dissolve. I confess that I see nothing but convulsion & Revolution, if an antireforming Ministry is formed. The Country will not long bear to see a popular Measure of this Sort sanctioned by the King, rejected by those whose private Interests are promoted by the continuance of the present System.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

P.S.

I am this moment returned from the Palais Royal. The King had heard nothing of the rejection of your Reform Bill, & he had seen Rothschild at 5 o'clock, who told him there was no news from England. The King seems determined that His Govt shall act with more vigour against the Seditious [?] of Tumult. He told me that he had been stopped by a National Guard, who complained that a man by whom he had been disarmed when on duty, was daily meeting him in the streets & insulting him, & the National Guards would not support the Crown, if the Crown did not support them.

GC/GR/130

Paris

March 8th 1851

My dear Palmerston,

The Private communication which I transmitted to you by the Messenger of last night relative to the Conference between Marshall Maison & Prince Metternich is perfectly correct. Count Sebastiani talked yesterday to Baron Werther of the necessity of France calling into Service the 80,000 balloted Men, in consequence of the Language of the Austrian Minister.

I have reason to believe that Marshall Soult in the Council yesterday urged the expediency of making this augmentation to the army, but the King has not (as yet at least) consented to sign the ordonnance [sic] .

I am,

Yours most sincerely

(Granville.

Ref.: 131 GC/GR

Paris, March 11, 1851.

My Dear Palmerston,

Our ~~Belgic~~ ministrerial crisis is not over, and until I see the list of the new administration in the *moniteur*, I shall feel doubtful as to its composition and colour; it is clear that La Fitte(?) will go out; it seems most probable that Casimir Perier will be the leader of the new Gov.; but I should not be surprised very much, if after all Odillon Barrot, and Duporit or L'Eare and Co. were to be the ministers. You will see by the last paragraph of my despatch that if Casimir Perier forms the Gov., we shall all likelyhood lose Seb.; a loss, which you I think, will not deeply deplore; but provoked as I have been by his occasional fits of irritation and arrogance, disgusted as I have been at times with his varillations, and his Belgick intrigues, of which however I am inclined to think he was made the instrument, than the instigation, still I shall be sorry to lose him. He was easy of access, he was good humoured and accomodating in the transaction of ordinary business; he had no anti-English prejudices, he was sincerely anxious to procure peace. These are all redeeming qualities. Casimir P., I am told, professes ~~that~~ Tallegrand will be the real minister for foreign affairs, although continuing to reside in London as French ambassador.

You must have been surprised to have seen in the French newspaper the extract from Marshal Maison's despatch containing an account of his conference with P. Metternich. Seb. confidentially tells me that the despatch was read in the council and that from memory Spult reported it to the Editor of the *National*; the report he affirms is inaccurate; the language of Metternich was not as positive as represented. He allows however that Metternich said it would be better to risk the chances of war than the dangers of revolt; but what a state must have been that administration where such breaches of confidence could be permitted, and the traitor be allowed to continue in his office and in the council; and is it not extraordinary that he should be the only man who seems to be sure of remaining whether the party of the movement of the resistance comes to power.

I hear that Cas. P. insisted upon the K. not meddling so much in all the questions that come before the counsel, 'comment, said his Majesty, 'vous voulez que, j'abdique; non sire, c'est par que vous ne loyez pas dans la necessité d'abdiquer que j'insite (—).

Ref.: GC/GR 131 (continued)

The K. said to me last night, ' I am accused of want of firmness; but you know not the difficulty I have to find 'persons who will act under me with any spirit of energy'. The republicans, who were arrested (the leaders of the insurrectionary movements in (---) in Feb.) were confined in Gt. Polayie(?); an order was given to transfer them to another prison; they with sticks resisted this order, and the authorities gave up the execution of it. A trial of strength must take place between the Gov. and the party or movement ere long. The trial of the prisoners now under accusation or perhaps the anniversary of 20th March, which is the birthday of Duke de Neuchatel as well as the day of Bonaparte's entrance into Paris in 1815, will probably give occasion for the contest. The K.'s personal popularity has declined rapidly, but still I think the great body of the National Guard will be firm in the support of Gov. and established order, and regular troops of the Garrison are numerous.

Granville.

I think Pozzo's nerves much affected by these insults of the populace; he told me that if it were necessary to his position to have soldiers in his house for 2 days longer, he should ask for his passports.

10 o'clock PM, Friday.

There have been riots this day in the (---) (---) Antoine and attempts have been made to rescue the prisoners confined in the pillorie . In this attempt 14 of the populace were wounded and some leaders taken prisoner.

A considerable disturbance is expected to take place in Paris tomorrow.

Ref.: GC/GR 132

Paris, March 14, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

If you need one of the Bulletin's of Goldsmith's correspondents, you will see mention made of my conversation with the K. about Seb. although my language is not accurately reported, yet the substance of what I said, and what the K. answered, is tolerably correct. Flahant, Seb. himself, Pozzo, and Werther, are the only persons to whom I communicated that conversation. This is not the first instance I have had of the good information of this correspondent. I believe that I contributed very much to keep Seb. in office, and he has expressed his obligations to me, though he talks of the difficulties of his situation and of his wish to retire. He volunteered this morning the subject of Leopold by telling me that he had sounded Cas. P. upon it. If this project be as you suspect a mere bait held out to induce us to discourage the P. of O. whilst they are intriguing from hence to obtain other objects, I think by means of Cas. P. the truth may be ascertained. I told Seb., that the furtherance of his scheme by the English Gov. would only create an impression that English interests were to be promoted by the election of Leopold, and that though we should not probably make any objection to his acceptance of the crown, if it were offered to him, we should not make any efforts to obtain the offer.

Seb. dwelt much in his conversation with me this morning, upon his partiality to the English connection, and his disinclination to any system of alliance with Russia. He intimated to me that Russia was disposed to transfer to the present reigning Royal Family of France those engagements by which the elder branch of the house of Bourbon was to have been connected with the imperial family of Russia. He asked me if I was aware that an agreement had been made for the marriage of the Duc de Bourdeaux to a daughter of the Emp. Nicholas; and he told me in great confidence, a confidence which I was at liberty to communicate to you only in a private letter, that one of the principal objects of Montmart's mission to St. Petersburg was to break off that engagement. He said I was perhaps not apprized of the hostile feelings of the Emp. towards England, in consequence of the conduct of the English Gov. at the time he was engaged in the war against Turkey, that his object had been to ally himself with France, and withdraw France from its alliance with England.

Seb. regretted that you had as yet expressed no opinion about this question of Austrian interference in Italy.....

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 136

Paris, March 21, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I left off writing to you on Friday night because Cas. P. called here; he seemed not a little surprised, when I told him of Seb.'s inevitable war of this morning, and of his most probable war of the evening. Cas. was quite specific but dropped an obscure hint of the advantage to Europe, which would be desired, if by some little cession to France a peace party could acquire popularity in France. They are all very greedy and want to nibble at their righteous frontier. Even Rothchild attacked me the other day about the other powers doing nothing to help the pacifist ministry; I asked him what it was which France wanted. London he answered would satisfy them. I told him to do his best to make the French Gov. satisfied with what now belonged to France; for that their repeated indications of a wish to encroach, made other Govs. distrustful of the security of a wish for peace; that Europe must make its stand upon the treaties, which Louis P. on his recognition by other courts pledged himself to observe, and that he might depend upon it, the only chance of peace was his faithful fulfilment of that pledge. I said all this because (as you know) the Rothchild of Paris is more consulted by the French ministers, than is the Rothchild of London by Lord Grey and you.

I wish we were well out of this Lux question with its adjunct of Bouillon. Werther says that the part of Bouillon which in 1815 was given up by the French was ceded to the pays bas, and not to the Duchy of Lux., consequently the new state of Belgium has a fair claim to that part of the Duchy of Bouillon. The castle of Bouillon was in 1814 given to the Duchy of Lux.; but if it be the possession of that fort which gives umbrage to France, he says no objection to its being razed. Humbolt shrunk from the notion of the troops of the Germanic Federation wresting from the Belgians the Lux. territory; and I have my suspicions that if the conference push matters to extremities upon any point, not of vital importance the Prussian Gov. will fail you. I would not in a public despatch intimate this doubt, for I may have an erroneous impression, but having received it from the tone of Humbolt's conversation, and partly from Seb.'s professions of satisfaction with the pacifick sentiments and conduct of his Prussian Majesty, I should do wrong not to mention it to you in a private letter.

Seb. told me this morning that he had learnt from Brisson who is arrived at Paris from Brussels, that Belliard and he both dined at the Regent's on the evening before the proclamation about Lux.

Ref.: GC/GR 136 (continued)

appeared in the papers, and that not a word was said by (—) de Choquin to either his guests on the subjects. (—) de Choquin said that he had a 2 hours conference with Lord Ponsonby in which Lord P. complained very much of the influence of France over the Belgic Gov. and recommended him to place more confidence in England; and that Choquin replied that the influence of England being entirely employed to overturn the present Gov. with the view of placing the P. of O. on the throne, it would not be expected that he could feel any reliance on the friendship of the English Gov..

The new ministry have found the finances in a lamentable state; they say that they propose these pinching taxes that the country may feel great preparations for war cannot be made without sacrifices, and to give the people a distaste for the further sacrifices which actual war would entail. They talk of their great wish to disarm, and Seb. this day, when I observed to him how little France had to apprehend from the other continental powers, answered if England would make with us a defensive alliance we would disarm directly. I reminded him, that paragraph in your armament despatch when you say England would use its efforts to prevent aggression on France; yes, he answered, but declarations of a ministry in a representative Gov. where changes easily and frequently happen, are not to be relied upon. We must have something more positive to enable us to disarm.

Louis P. is much pleased with the Emp. Nicholas sending Alfred de Damos(?) and the other agent (I forgot who) of Charles 10.

Granville.

April 1st 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I passed nearly two hours tete a tete with the King on Wednesday Evening, of which his own Talk occupied about 115 minutes for he hardly even left me an interval to say a single word. Some Indications of dissatisfaction with Sebastiani appeared in the course of his Conversation. He complained of the style of his diplomatick Notes, & said there was nothing so difficult to overcome as la Verite d'auteur, & took great credit to himself for softening down the expressions in his Austrian Note. Casimir Perier also last night obscurely hinted to me that the course of the Govt in foreign affairs was shackled by indiscreet Promises regarding Belgium as well as Italy; I should not therefore be surprised if when the Chambers are prorogued (which Casimir Perier told me would take place in 8 or 10 days) & when the opportunity of making a splash in the Tribune will no longer be afforded to Sebatiani, he should be removed from his office, perhaps to make way for Casimir Perier himself. I believe that Casimir would be honourable & straightforward, & that he is strongly impressed with the necessity of preserving Peace, but he is irascible, & capable of taking sudden & violent Resolutions. I was sorry to hear that he talks of playing the whole game if forced into war. He told the Sardinian ambassador, if the passage through Piedmont was refused, that the French Govt would support the Revolutionists. To me last night, he said that the King of Sardinia was dying, & that his death would occasion great changes. He intimated that the Prince de [?] would constitutionalize his Country; that Austria could have no pretence for interposing, but that if she did, the new King of Sardinia would rely with Reason on the support of France.

I have written so much today & have heard so very long a Sermon from our Bishop, that I am quite tired & headachey, so will leave off with your Permission.

I am

Yours sincerely

Granville.

April 4th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

The Packet will ^{leave} later at a very early Hour on Wednesday Morning. I am therefore not at liberty to detain the Messenger, & I have only a few moments left for my private Letter.

Sebastiani himself shows no symptoms of quitting his office, but I collect from Casimir Perier's conversation that he is only waiting for a good opportunity to make a Change. My impression is confirmed by a communication which has reached me from a M. Tissot who is an adherent, indeed an intimate Friend of Perier, who composed the speech made by Perier in the Chamber of Deputies, explanatory of the Principles of the new administration. M. Tissot has also had conveyed to me a wish that you or Grey would take some opportunity in Parliament of expressing your confidence in C. Perier's administration; he says it would do it a world of good.

I think the Italian affair will blow over; the Tone of Metternich's letter to [Apponi?], though pert & contemptuous about the Non Intervention Principle, upon the whole promises well for a favorable consideration of the French Note, asking for Evacuation. On the other hand, the Language of Russia, as it appears in Lord Heytesbury's despatch is calculated to encourage Austria to take a high Tone. Pozzo (I hope he will not be troubled for it) has on the contrary been strongly urging Tatischev to recommend to Metternich not to reject the French Proposal. The fact is, that we who on the spot are witness to all the difficulties which the moderate & well intentioned, peacefully inclined People have to encounter here, we who are impressed with the Belief that if this Government is overturned, Revolutionary war will be attempted all over Europe, naturally feel very anxious that the present Minister should not be lowered in the eyes of France. Your despatch to Lord Cowley is excellent. I communicated the substance of it to Sebastiani, who was highly pleased with it, & Casimir Perier caught at the Idea of the Pope being persuaded to ask for the retirement of the Austrian Troop, as one which might relieve all parties from Embarrassment. I think most of your diplomats are of a very anti-liberal caste. Lord Heytesbury seems to delight in the Help which the Russians promise to give to Austria, & to exult in the successes over the poor Poles, as if England was much interested in their destruction. Even by [?] Reports, the Poles seem to

have made a defence calculated to excite the admiration of Europe - very different from the Italians: Metternich says the Austrians marched into Bologna without even loading their arms.

Cas. Perier told me last night, that the French Govt had yesterday recd despatches by which they learnt that Bavaria, Wirtenberg, & Baden had declared they would not join in any war against France in which their own Interests were not immediately concerned, & which did not effect the Germanick Confederation. I must leave off so adieu.

Yours sincerely

Granville.

P.S.

I must add that the French make a great point of the Austrians not having possession of Ancona. If that Port be taken, & not speedily evacuated, I suspect the French will send a fleet to the Adriatick to blockade it.

Accounts from Staulaise have been received. He was prepared with a Protest against the Entry of the Austrians into

GC/GR/144

Paris

April 4th 1851

My dear Palmerston,

As a Courier will be despatched to London this day at three o'clock & may perhaps arrive there a day earlier than the English Messenger who set off late this Evening, I avail myself of the opportunity to tell you that when I called upon Count Sebastiani this morning, I found upon his table the Protocol of the 20th of Jan & he told me that he had just declared to M. Le [Hon—?], the Belgick Envoy that unless the Belgick Govt acceded fully & [?] to the arrangements of Limits therein specified (with the Reserve only of the Duchy of [Bouiller]) that it would look for no support whatever from the French Govt & he had also written to Gen. Belliard to make the same declaration at Brussels.

I am

My dear Palmerston

Yours sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/145

Paris

April 6th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I am informed that accounts have this morning been received of the Austrian Troops having entered Ancona; the Principal Leaders of the Insurrection had embarked.

Rothschild has received Intelligence of the Russians having begun constructing Bridges for the Passage of the Vistula, & active operations were on the Point of commencing.

The Trial of the Republican Conspirators is now going on. I hear that a considerable mob is assembled about the avenues of the Court of Justice, but the Govt seem quite confident in the efficacy of the Precautions they have taken to preserve the public Peace.

I am

My dear Palmerston

Yours sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/146

Paris

April 7 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I conjecture from your Note respecting Bowring, that he has been quoting me in his correspondence, I have been civil to him, as far as seeing him when he has called, & listening to what he has to tell me, but I have never said to him any thing which might not without permission be inserted in the Newspaper. He sees Lafayette, [Odillen — ?] & others of the Party. He had an Hours conversation with the King. He sees the Belgians; & has all along assured me that the Prince of Orange could never have a chance of establishing himself in Belgium. He thinks the [Movement?] & war Party here will before long defeat the moderate & peaceable antagonists. Positive Information I have not obtained from him - perhaps he tells more to his [Treasury ?] Friends.

Yours sincerely

Granville.

April 11th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

The Marquis de Rezende, the Brazilian Minister called upon me on Saturday. He thinks it probable that an attempt may be soon made to overthrow the Govt of Don Miguel, but is apprehensive that a French & Jacobin Party will gain the ascendancy in Portugal to the exclusion of the Palmella Regency & the Friends of England; he is not without fear that even [?] may fall into their Hands (this explains [Saldanha's ?] application to me last week to have permission to go for a month to Gibraltar). The departure of the Marquis de V. Amaro is as Rezende says, much to be regretted. He was recalled by the Emperor of the Brasils in consequence of Lord Aberdeen having declared that the British Govt had decided to recognize Don Miguel, & that no proposition with respect to the future State of Portugal, which was not founded upon that Recognition would meet with attention from the Courts of London. The Marquis de V. Amaro, M. Rezende said was a most honourable respectable Man, but of a cautious Character, & who would not take upon himself [spontaneously] to remain in England, notwithstanding the change of Ministers, & alteration of circumstances, but if you thought that it might be useful to have in England an Envoy from the Emperor of Brasil, who enjoyed the confidence of His Imperial Majesty, & who was ~~xxxx~~ much respected by the Portuguese adherents of Donna Maria, the expression of such an opinion by you would be sufficient to induce the Marquis de V. Amaro to delay his intended departure from London. I gave no other answer to the Marquis de Rezende than that I would report to you in a Private Letter the substance of his Conversation, and upon my making him that Promise, he said he should write to the Marquis de V. Amaro not to leave England without seeing you.

I am

My dear Palmerston

Yours sincerely

Granville.

April 11th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I wish I could see our way out of this Belgick question. I am not without my Fears that we shall at best get embroiled in a war, perhaps with a good diplomatic Case, but not a war in which Govt will find itself supported by the publick feeling of the Country. The House of Commons, particularly a reformed House of Commons, will be reluctant to resist all the advantages of Peace, & vote extraordinary war supplies, unless for an object obviously essential to the Honour & Interests of England. Although we may be able to prove that Bouillon by Treaty belongs to the King of Holland & not to Belgium, I doubt your being able to persuade the Publick that it was either our Duty or Interest to risk all the Consequences of war for such an object. The Patience & Temper of the Minsiters here are put to hard Trial by the unceasing attacks made upon them for their Submissiveness to the other Great Powers of Europe. They have been humiliated by Austria taking her Course in Italy unmoved by the Representations of the French Govt, & they are reproached with now subscribing to whatever arrangements England & Prussia think fit to dictate respecting Belgium. They want to show some one little Point to the French Nation in which some deference has been manifested to the opinions & wishes of the French Government.

It is disagreeable to me to have to report the Language of Sebastiani respecting Lord Ponsonby; in my publick despatch I have told you that his [Orangist ?] Reputation destroyed his Influence with those who are not of the Orange Party; but Sebastiani also complained that in a despatch of the Regent [? Chaquin] to [Letton] it is represented that Ponsonby had remonstrated with him upon the Influence France enjoyed in the Councils of the Belgick Govt, & Sebastiani observed that such remonstrance was calculated to destroy all Notion of cooperation & Concert between the British & French Governments.

This complaint reminds me of that which is made by [Guilleminot], who states that the Prejudice of Gordon against the Greeks is so strong that it is impossible to cooperate with him in the Negotiation of the arrangements between them & the Turks, which has not yet been settled.

The Session of the Chamber of Deputies will probably close on Friday next, & I think before the new Chamber meets the Belgick Question will have been concluded, or we shall be at war. Casimir, though pacific in his principles, is hasty & irascible, & may in a moment of anger

GC/GR/148

take some Resolution at variance with his general opinions. He spoke to me last night of his apprehension of the Insurgents being treated with cruel severity by the Italian Govt, & was anxious that our agents there should cooperate with those of France in enjoining a system of Mildness & conciliation - the capture of the Vessel in which [?] was embarked with his associates was unfortunate.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

April 18th 1861

My dear Palmerston,

I saw Casimir Perier last night. I told him of the satisfaction you felt at the change of Tone & Language which had appeared in the communications from the French Government since the direction of affairs had been placed in his Hands, but I warned him of the necessity of keeping a watchful eye to prevent the continuance or renewal of Intrigues which during the Presidency of his Predecessor had been much as to excite mistrust & suspicion. I then informed him of Soult's arms & Equipment agent having attempted to enter upon an underhand Negotiation (through Moberley, & to be kept a Secret from Talleyrand) having for object the consent of England to a partition of the Belgick Territory. Cas. Perier seems never disposed to doubt or to defend the tortuous Policy of the [?] Cabinet, but he replied that as long as he was at the head of the Govt I might be sure that whatever the French Govt mean to do, or wanted, it should be stated frankly, clearly, & without Reserve. I observed to him that [M. Lebeau] gave him no credit for good faith, & that it really behoved the French Govt to manifest their Indignation at this Interpretation of their Honour. M. Cas. Perier said that having only knowledge of this Speech of M. Lebeau from a Newspaper Report he could not publish an official denial of what he had said, but that Count Sebastiani's Note to [M. Litton] was too explicit & positive to allow the Belgick Minister to pretend or doubt in future respecting the Intentions of the King of the French.

Casimir Perier, & Sebastiani are both waiting with anxious impatience for the fruits of your last conference on Belgick affairs. Do not imagine that I am not advocating Concessions to the French Government; I have uniformly said to the Ministers & to others here that Louis Philippe was only recognized on the condition of his abiding by the Treaties which in 1814 & 1815 settled the Peace of Europe, that if we once allowed the Doctrine of Convenience to supercede the stipulations of the Treaties, there could be no end to the changes which might follow such an admission. But I should entirely be disposed to consider not only with candour, but with Favour any Interpretation of a Treaty attempted to be established by the French Government, which did not materially affect the Security, & Interests of other States, because I think that it is of the utmost importance to the Peace & Tranquillity of the World that this Govt should be looked up to, should enjoy the consideration of the French

GC/GR/151

Nation - & the French Nation are too vain & susceptible to be satisfied with any Govt which appears to have no Influence in the Counsels of the Great Powers of Europe. I believe that if the present Ministry should be upset the Throne of Louis Philippe would not long survive the Overthrow; & think you may have some Notion of the Sort of Government which would succeed it & with which you would have to deal. I enclose a copy of [Cavaigne's ?] Speech, in which the Principles of 1793 are advocated with an eloquence & vigour far beyond that with which they were originally promulgated.

9 o'clock P.M.

I am just returned from the Palais Royal. I went there to present Lord Erskine to the King. Casimir Perier came in much pleased with the accounts which his Son has brought from Talleyrand of your Conference on Belgium; & seemed to be sanguine as to the settlement of the question. I told him, if he sent an Envoy to Brussels, to take care that he should be one of his choice, one who would act honestly, one who would not be intriguing to promote some arriere pensee. He answered that he understood my Hint, & would attend to it, & he added diplomats are not so much to blame, when they act in the sense of their Government.

I am

Yours most sincerely

Granville.

April 22 1831

10 o'clock P.M.

My dear Palmerston,

This has been a hard day's work; our conference lasted from 10 till 1 - & I have had to despatch the Messenger to Ponsonby, as well as to write to you, besides little occasional business with which I have been interrupted. I have therefore hardly Time now to answer your private letter on the Question of the Belgick Fortresses, which I regret the more as my view of our Rights as well as Interests does not agree with that entertained by you. You of course will understand that my Language to Cas, Perier, or indeed to any other with whom I may converse upon the Subject here, is conformable to your opinions. I believe I have before stated to you my Reason for thinking that it is the Interest of every country but France to have all the Fortresses which belong to the Belgians dismantled. I cannot bring myself to believe that under any Prince, or under any form of Government, Belgium will be able to [extricate ?] itself from the overbearing influence of France, & whether Ostend, or whether Namour be kept as fortresses to check the advance of a French army, it will be found that whenever a fortified Town is garrisoned by Belgian Troops, that Town will serve as an [office ?] rather than as an obstacle to be overcome. Now with respect to the Right of the allies to exclude France from all interference in this question, I cannot but think it doubtful. It signifies little, what were the ~~extractions~~ ^{extractions}, which were employed to construct these fortifications; the moment that you acknowledged the Independence of Belgium you abandoned all claim to the disposal of their Fortresses - they become the sole & entire property of the Belgick Govt. You may advise that Govt as to the means of defending itself against its powerful Neighbour France, but has not France also the Right to advise the same Govt as to the best means of defending itself against Holland or against Prussia.

I have just heard that Gascoyne's Motion was carried by a Majority of eight. You may well suppose that I am not a little anxious to learn what will be the consequence of that defeat. Our Reform question creates here almost as much Interest as in England.

I am

Yours most sincerely

Granville.

Funds
n

GC/GR/154

Paris

April 25th 1831

10 $\frac{1}{2}$ P.M.

My dear Palmerston,

The Messenger whom I despatched on Friday last to Brussels has this Instant returned from thence with a Letter from ⁰Phonby, who writes to me that he is confirmed by Time in all the opinions which he has given to you relative to the danger of hasty & strong Measures. He now thinks that it will be found impossible to carry into execution a Plan of Coersion against Belgium, subjected to all the Conditions & Regulations already devised by the French Govt. He hopes Belliard may come authorized to delay. He believes that the Belgians are ready to risk all publick Evil in defending their Pretended Limits, & that they are fools enough to imagine that they can do what the Poles are said to have done. Id P. adds that there is no doubt numerous Promises from the Military in the Depts of [Haut & Bas Eliss & Moselle ?] have been made to support the Luxembourgois.

This is I think the substance of P's Letter to me. The decision of the conference upon the last communication from the French Govt will probably have been taken before this reaches you.

Yours most sincerely

Granville.

April 25th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I have in the first Place to thank you very much for having despatched to me a special Messenger with the gratifying Intelligence that the King had consented to dissolve the Parliament. There was evidently no choice between dissolution & Resignation; the Party opposed to you were so numerous, so active & well organised, that your Progress in the Bill, even if you had given way on the question of the number of the Members of the future House of Commons, would have been arrested every Instant by amendments, & Propositions calculated to defeat the Measure of Reform. I was very happy to be able to announce from authority this signal demonstration of the confidence of the King in his present Ministers. Casimir Perier seemed unaffectedly rejoiced that no change of Government in England was likely to occur, & I must say that even the Representatives of the more despotick Governments are not reluctant to acknowledge that the liberal Ministry of England has been as firm in its resistance to the encroachments of France, as could have been an anti-Reform administration.

I have a publick despatch reported to you what passed between Sebastiani & me in consequence of your private Letter in which you state that [Z — ?] begged for an Insinuation in favour of his Government about the [Courier arrest?]. You will not think Sebastiani's language satisfactory, but I received last night assurances from Casimir Perier on the same subject which satisfy me that we need apprehend nothing very serious in that quarter.

I am

Yours most sincerely

Granville.

I have written both to Cowley, & to Gordon on what has passed here on the subject of Guilleminot's pugnacious Proceedings.

P.S.

What a bloody cruel Ukase the Emperor Nicholas has issued against the [— itians?]. I hear too that the Cardinals & Priests of Rome breathe fire & vengeance against the Bolognese.

April 29th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

You must be so engaged with your Election that you will not have time to read any thing on foreign Politics, & I have an attack of gout, which though it affects not my Hands, makes writing difficult & disagreeable. I have been confined to my couch during the last two days. I cannot put my Foot to the ground, & shall not be able to go out probably for some days to come. Sebastiani however promises to make me daily visits, & to keep me au courant. He told me today that St aulaise is very much pleased with the support he receives from Brook Taylor, & that [Latzow] the Austrian [] is behaving well, but the [] ? Zeleati [], the high church Priests are strongly urging the Papal Govt to Measures of severity against the Insurgents. Letton, he says, is using his best Efforts to persuade the Belgians to adhere to your Protocols, but the Belgick Govt still cling to the notion of purchasing from the King of Holland his Rights, & of becoming a member of the Germanick Confederation. I should like to know what impression Ponsonby's views & opinions have made upon you, & whether you feel no apprehensions of the consequences which may follow the employment of force to carry into execution the decisions of the conference.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

I feel very anxious about your Cambridge Election. I am afraid of your Parsons being strong against Reform.

Ref.: GC/GR 162

Paris, May 16, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I think if Lux. be left as a subject of ulterior negotiation, you may perhaps arrive at a solution of the Belgian difficulties. If you insist on the unqualified adherence of the Belgians to your protocol by force alone will you be able to accomplish your object and I confess since I have read the last communication of last night from Franckort I see great difficulty in the employment of a corps sufficiently strong to induce the Belgians to early submission. The Germans seem determined to throw the whole burdon of the campaign on the K. of Holland, the Dutch will not grant a (stivee) for an object which is personal to this sovereign, and from which the Dutch nation will reap no advantage.

It was ill judged in Flahant to write to Lord Grey about Chad. - Flahant asked me what sort of man was his English colleague at Berlin. I said ~~in~~ a very good natured obliging man, not wanting in talent, having no strong opinions of his own in politicks, but unofficially brought into the diplomatic line by late Lord Londondery I suppose that it was this account which induced Flahant to express to Lord Grey his apprehension that he should not find Chad disposed to cooperate cordially with him. Flahant, as he well may be is sincerely dubious that the English and French Govs. could be upon the footing the most freindly and confidential, and I am therefore very glad and you will write to Chad to be upon the most cordial terms with Flahant. -

I am not as sanguine as you to the prolonged resistance of the Poles; I think (---) marks in the Russian ~~resistance~~ army is their only chance; the odds in numbers are too great.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 163

Paris, May 20, 1831.

Re.: Charles 10's intrigues in Great Britain; agitation in Brittany.

Ref.: GC/GR 164

Paris, May 20, 1831.

Re.:

My Dear Palmerston,

Your indignation will have been excited against Seb. when you had my account of the peremptory manner in which he in the first instance declared that France would not allow the sovereign of Belgium to be a member of the Germanick confederation. These ebullitions of temper come on him occasionally, but the fit of this morning was of short duration, for when I quitted him, he talked as if there was nothin he would not do to promote the success of Lord Ponsonby's endeavours. I shall however be curious to see Tallegrand's despatch in which he insists on the necessity of no distinction being made in the tenure of Belgium and Lux. by the sovereign of the two countries.

Remainder irrelevant....

Ref.: GC/GR 165

Paris, May 23, 1831.

Re.: French internal matters etc.. and

..... Belliard's despatches received this morning from Belgium give rather a more favourable account of the state of things.....

Ref.: GC/GR 166

Paris, May 23, 1831.

Re.: Papal Staes; French internal affairs; also included a letter ~~Myxheaxx~~ of Granville to Sir Brook Taylor, re. the above.

Ref.: GC/GR 167

Paris, May 25, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

.... internal French affairs..... and

I shall not feel at ease with regard either to the external or internal peace of France until the elections are over, and a good peaceable moderate chamber be elected. If you can make even a temporary settlement of the Belgick affairs, it will tell favourably for the French elections. The excitement which could be produced by the commencement of hostilities would do great mischief here, and you have done I can use very wisely to endeavour by a very slight degree of deception to obtain concession to keep the Belgians quiet.

Ref.: GC/GR 168

Paris, May 27, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

Seb's last instructions to Belliard which he read to me this morning direct him cordially to second Ponsonby, and to use his utmost efforts to induce the Belgians to conform to the bienveillentes intentions of the conference. It will not be for want of sincere cooperation between the 2 Govs. (at this stage of our proceedings at least) if war be not avoided,

I found Seb. today dissatisfied with the Austrians and distrustful of Metternich.....

Ref.: CC/GR 169

Paris, May 30, 1831.

Re.: Polish affairs; rumours of a plot to abdicate King; ... and

I suppose before the end of this week we shall have an insight into the Belgick affairs; never had mediators such untractable parties to bring together; both preferring to risk all the chances of war, rather than accede to a reasonable arrangement. Why should the K. of Holland wish to retain or rather acquire possession of a country seperated from his Dominions with a population discontented, and a capital garrisoned by foreign troops, and of which the revenues will be absorbed by the debt which he will incur in conquering it from its present possessors, rather than receive a just compensation ~~from~~ in money for its loss, if it were not that he hopes by prolonging the present state of affairs some chance ~~may~~ turn up favourable to the recovery of his authority in Belgium. He had better however be a little cautious in playing the game. - The Dutch have no wish that their K. should possess Lux., as I learn here from Dutchmen on whose information I can rely, and they will be little disposed to bear the burdens of armaments continued for purposes foreign to their own interests.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 170

Paris, May 31, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I made a point of receiving Count Seb. as soon as I received your letter of the 29th. He assures me that the most imperative instructions have been given to Gen. Belliard to quit Brussels in the case of Lord Ponsonby leaving it in consequence of the Belgians accepting the proposal bases of separation between Belgium and Holland. In a despatch which he has sent this evening to Gen. Belliard, he renews that instruction.

Granville.

PS

Count Seb. expressed his regret that Lord Ponsonby had not shown to Gen. Belliard his letters to M. Lebeau. The omitting to do so, having the appearance of want of confidence.

Ref.: GC/GR 171

Paris, June 2, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

Count Seb. has just read to me a despatch from Gen. Belliard dated the 1st of June, at 1 AM, in which he that he had taken upon himself to adjourn to the 10th of this month the executions of the instructions of the protocol of 10th May, No. 23, which by the 5th article of the 24th protocol he was directed to execute on the 1st. He says that Lord Ponsonby 'abonde d'en (---), but I could not make out to what extent, or in what manner Lord P. had cooperated in deferring the execution of the instructions of the conference, nor does the despatch say anything positive as to Lord P.'s intent of quitting Brussels. I have no doubt that Gen. Belliard thought he was acting for the best, when he made up his mind to disobey the orders of his Gov.. Those orders, as you know, were positive, and P. Tallegrand will of course show you the despatch which Count Seb. has this day written to Gen. Belliard in which the disapprobation of his Gov. is expressed in the most unequivocal terms; and nothing can more strongly manifest the determination of the French ministers to continue their cooperation with us in this difficult negotiation. You will see that Gen. Belliard is directed positively to leave Brussels in case Lord P. should have left it; I expressed to Count Seb. my satisfaction at this peremptory order having been given observing that whatever might be the inducements by which Gen. Belliard had been led to take upon himself the responsibility of adjourning the period fixed by the conference for communicating the resolutions contained in the protocol of the 10th May, it was of the last importance that it should be known to the public that the British and French Govs. continued to act in concert.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 172

Paris, June 3, 1831

Re.: Granville's illness explained to Palm..

Ref.: GC/GR 173

Paris,

My Dear Palmerston,

... Austrian and Bavarian affairs; Charles 10;.... and

I am not anxious to know whether Ponsonby can suggest any course of proceeding which shall enable P. Leopold to accept the proffered throne. I agree with Ponsonby that the possible evils of war beginning in Belgium may be of a character dangerous to the general tranquillity of Europe; he does not I think overstate the effect it may have in the country; if the ministry of Cas. P., when endeavouring to act in concert with the other powers of the conference against Belgium should from the unpopularity of such a system of policy be overset, and the Jacobin war party ~~going~~ gaining the ascendancy should begin a propaganda war against all Europe, I doubt whether the people of England will be satisfied to have got into this scrape by supporting the K. of Holland in his right to which he clings, like Shylock to his pound of flesh, not because it will be of any advantage to him, but because by so doing he thinks he can be revenged on others by whom he thinks he has been ill used. Seb. told me today that he had heard from Berlin that the K. of Holland did not care about Lux., but that he ~~disliked~~ disliked the manner in which it is attempted to wrest it from him.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 174

Paris, June 8, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

You must not be surprised at the apprehension felt by Cas. P. at the approaching crisis in Belgium, nor at his wishing to try every expedient to avoid coming to measures of extremity. There is no doubt that the Jacobins are working hard to excite disaffection in the army. At Tarascon, at Metz and at some other places symptoms have here shown of the success of these efforts, and if as Felix Mirode threatened, the tricolor flag is hoisted in Belgium, it is difficult to say what effect it may produce. There is no disinclination in Perier, nor in Seb. to use compulsory means. Perier said, in his peculiarly emphatic manner this morning, these Jacobins threaten us in every thing, they have the means of paralysing the resolutions of the 5 powers. Seb. quoted Napoleon for saying that the Jacobins were the only enemy who were really formidable. They are for the moment surpressed in France, and it is through Belgium they hope to recover their ascendancy.

Werther, who is about to take the direction of affairs in Berlin, feels reluctant to begin hostilities.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 175

Paris, June 10, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Cas. P. this morning asked me to explain to him how it happened that the conference should have discussed making their disavowal of Ponsonby's letter to Lebeau, ~~was said if the election of Leopold~~ until after the intelligence of the election of Leopold had reached London. He said if the election of Leopold was not made to serve the purpose of negotiation, it would have been better to have made a declaration so distinct as to have ~~been~~ rendered his election by the congress impossible except on the conditions of their adhering to the Bases de Sep.. He considered it to be a misfortune to have used up Leopold unnecessarily.

The funds here are falling rapidly, and a general alarm and expectation of war prevails; how it will begin, or what shape it will take, seems very uncertain. It is evident to me that Prussia would prefer asking considerable sacrifices rather than commit herself in hostilities; Weyther expressed regret this morning even, at our having scaled the intimations of France respecting the recovery of Philliporth. I hear from Nagel that Holland will not pay any thing to enable the K. to repossess himself of Lux. and you may rest assured that neither Perrier, nor the K. Louis Phil. could give any assistance against the Belgians; I doubt even whether they would venture to employ a French gun-boat to assist in blockading the ports; and have you no apprehension of the publick opinion in England being adverse to engaging in a war, not for the sake of keeping Belgium out of the clutches of France but to enforce the right of the K. of Holland to a territory which the Belgians are unwilling to relinquish, and which his own subjects will not help him to recover. I questioned Perier as to the justice of the French demands in Portugal etc.....

The courier whose midnight departure set agog the whole diplomatic corps at the Hague was sent to Francfort, the object of his journey was to obtain money for the K. of Holland. I think I shall set off from hence this day week, and be in London on Sunday night or Monday morning at least if I am well. I am still very uncomfortable from influenza.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 176

Copy of the previous letter.

Ref.: GC/GR 177

Paris, June 13, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Cas. P. is ill in bed with the epidemic disorder, which they denominate the 'grippe', and Seb. is also suffering from the same complaint.....

Belliard arrived here this morning, but I have not seen him. Le Han(?) was with me yesterday, saying that there could be no objection to acceding to the protocol of the 20th Jan. which gives to Holland only what it had in 1790, and leaves to Belgium all which was not then possessed by the States Gen., but with a book of treaties in his hand, and a map marking with red spots the Dutch villages in Limburg, he tried to prove that the Belgians had the right to purchase from the Dutch Maestricht itself as well as the 52 villages, which he maintained were isolated spots cut off from each other as well as from Holland by the intervention of Belgian territory.

...Portuguese affairs.....

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 178

Paris, July 8, 1831 , Friday evening.

My Dear Palmerston,

I am just returned from Mr. Cloud when I went to present old Lord Lyne--north to the King. I saw there Cas. P. and Seb.; they had no news from any quarter; they expect to learn tomorrow the decision of the Belgian congress. I ~~thought I saw~~ saw Soult with whom I had some conversation out of humour, and insisted that the difficulties of the Belgian question would be coloured by the election of the sovereign.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 179

Paris, July 11, 1831

Re.: Polish affairs.

Ref.: GC/GR 180

Paris, July 15, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I believe that the nomination of Leopold is not popular in France, and the ministers feeling somewhat apprehensive of the attacks of the opposition in the chamber, will not be persuaded to speak of the demolition of the fortresses, as a point left open for negotiation. They will represent that by their firmness, they have forced the Austrians to evacuate the Papal States.

Papal States and Russian affairs.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 181

Copy of previous letter.

Ref.: GC/GR 182

Paris, July 18, 1831.

Re.: A note despatched by Mr. O'Reilly concerning Irish affairs.

Ref.: GC/GR 183

Paris, July 18, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

.... Polish affairs..... and

I heard of this language yesterday, and today Seb. said to me, "England looks always to her own interests; I do not blame her, but she must not find fault with others who may do the same; and he rather took shame for himself for not having recovered for France those places which she possessed in 1814, and which in 1815 were given to the K. of the Neth.. The treaty of Vienna as it respected Belgium he said was annulled by the dissolution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and France had an untroubled a right to recover what she possessed as Holland to obtain the limits of 1790. - All this language, coupled with the tone assumed respecting the K. of the Belgians not being a member of the Germanick Confed. and a certain hesitation in acknowledging Leopold as K., has an inauspicious appearance, and looks as if they doubted obtaining the support of the chamber to a specific policy. On the other hand you know Seb.'s storms are suddenly followed by a sky the most serene, and I do not therefore feel much alarmed by his ebullition of this morning.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 184

Paris, July 20, 1831

By.:Polish affairs..... and

..and Leopold is come back, much pleased with Leopold.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 185

Paris, July 20, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I received last night your letter of the 17th by a special messenger. I have this morning seen Count Seb. He has told me that no document regarding Belgium will be at present communicated to the chambers. The K. will state in his speech that the Kingdom of the Neth. such as it was constituted by the treaties of 1815 no longer exists. That the separation of Belgium from Holland, and the neutrality of its territory are recognized by the 5 powers; that the fortresses constructed since 1815 will be demolished; and that the K. of Belgium will not be a member of the Germanick Confed..

I repeated to Count Seb. the objections, which I had before urged against the diabolical character of the last two declarations; observing that the Belgick Gov. and people might with reason be offended at important questions regarding their country appearing to be resolved without their being at all consulted. Count Seb. in reply referred me to the note addressed to Prince Tallegrand, by the representatives of the 4 powers on the 14th of July, in which they assent to making public the intended demolition of the forts; and with respect to the last declaration he said, that the mention of Lux. had been properly avoided, and the phrase so worded, as passing by the relations of that Duchy to the Germanick Confed. to refer only to the K. of the Belgians.

Count Seb. expressed great anxiety that you should consider his reply to my enquiries as most confidential, the Gov. being most desirous that no part of the contents of the K.'s speech should transpire, before the delivery of it to the chamber, by his Majesty.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 186

Paris, July 22, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

... Various French internal affairs..... and

I have this morning read Leopold's speech to the congress; the passage respecting France is judicious, and calculated to mitigate the unpopularity of the nomination of what all newspapers here call, an English Prince. But Poland is the question on which.....

Ref.: GC/GR 187

Paris, July 25, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

... various French internal affairs... and

His Majesty is impatient to sign a convention with the K. of the Belgians, for the demolition of the forts. The French press here found not that, on which I never had the slightest doubt, that it would be better for the interests of France that they should not be destroyed. What do you mean to do with the K. of Holland?

... Polish affairs....

Ref.: GC/GR 188

Paris, July 28, 1831.

My Dear Palmerston,

These three anniversary days of July so entirely occupy the attention of the Gov. that there is no finding an opportunity of speaking to Seb. or Perier upon the different points referred to in the letter which I received from you yesterday by special messenger. Perier has not visible all this day, and as you see by my public despatch, I could see Seb. only for a few minutes which he occupied with his communications about party (---?). When Seb. first apprized me of the manner in which it was intended to announce in the K.'s speech the demolition of the fortresses, and that the K. of the

Ref.: GC/GR 189

Paris, July 29, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Le Han was with me yesterday; he was very indignant at not being allowed to present his letter notifying Leopold's accession. He says that the demolition of the forts is a question to which the K. cannot consent without the authority of the chambers; if that be so, the recognition by France of the K. cannot take place till the middle of September. Is it not strange that when the French Gov. has been using all its influence and propagating every intirgue to obtain the election of Leopold, insisting upon the necessity of establishing a regular instead of a provisional Gov. it should now hesitate to acknowledge the state of things, which it has been labouring to produce. I said to Seb. today that I had warned him of the embarrassment which might arrive from the manner in which the Belgian question was mentioned in the K.'s speech, and hinted to him that the general tone of it regarding french affairs was haughty towards other powers, he justified it by maintaining that if the ministers did not 'manager le susceptible' and flatter the vanity of France the reins with which they restrained yhe ardour of the nation would slip through their hands, and that it was the only eay of preserving peace. I am told that at the review today there was a very general cry of 'vivant les Polonais'.....

Polish, Portuguese and Spanish affairs.....

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 190

Paris, July 31, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

... Portuguese affairs.....

Ref.: GC/GR 191

Paris, August 1, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

Cas. P.'s threatened resignation..... and

A messenger has this moment arrived with your despatch about Greece. You recalled that C. Per. objected to the P. Fred. of G. as belonging to a family subjected to Russian influence. This as you observe is not a well founded objection; Pozzo tells me that he has the copy of a letter from P. Fred. in his possession, which had considerable effect in persuading ~~Barrot~~ Polignat to consent to his nomination. It may be perhaps produced with advantage at the present moment. Not if we have a change of ministry heaven knows only how our negotiation will go on regarding this, or any other question. I have however heard that Odillon Barrot has lately said that if he came into office he would be more pacific than the present ministers.

I had a conversation with Cas. P. last night, and there was something in his language which rather gave me the impression that he could be glad to avail himself of a pretext to retire. He was evidently annoyed at the embarrassment he has brought upon himself by the sable colour given in the K.'s speech to the intended demolition of the Belgian fortresses.

I met Belliard as I came downstairs tonight from the Palais Royal; he said, he was to set off tomorrow for Brussels, but he did not tell me whether he was to present credentials.

Granville.

Ref.: GC/GR 192

Paris, August 2, 1831

Re.: French elections.....

Ref.: GC/GR 193

Paris, August 3, 1831

Re.: Papal States; K.'s regret at the loss of Perier...

Ref.: GC/GR 194

Paris, August 4, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

There was no use in remonstrating against the entrance of the French army into Belgium because the decision had been taken, and announced in a manner that rendered it irrevocable. I thought it better therefore rather to get promises of early evacuation than to protest against immediate (—) being sent. I have confidence in Cas. P.'s declaration in favour of peace. The only use I apprehend will be made of the assistance given to Leopold will be to obtain the demolition of such forts as they may chose to designate.

It is a great compensation in this Dutch incident, that he retain Cas. P. in the ministry. The consternation was very great when it was believed he could not be induced to retract his resignation.

Ref.: GC/GR 195

Paris, August 5, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

I await with anxious impatience to know the impression produced in your cabinet by the march of the French army. Seb.'s letter contains I think nearly all the promises which he made to me yesterday verbally. Pozzo is very desirous that you should send a fleet into the Scheldt. He considers that its presence there will give a complexion to the march of the French army very different from what it will have, if it be the only succour sent to Leopold against the Dutch. Pozzo under the present circumstances, has very properly put off his journey to Engl.

Ref.: GC/GR 195 (cont.)

PS

Seb. was not prepared to talk about Greece, because thinking that he was about to quit office he had scarcely read Tallegrand's despatches on the subject.

Ref.: GC/GR 196

Paris, August 7, 1831

My Dear Palmerston,

The fly-out, as you call it, of the K. of Holland is unaccountable, and the tone of Luylen's reply to the note in which you ask for explanation, and apprise him of a squadron having to be assembled in the downs is as flippant, as the fly-out of his Royal Master was presumptuous and rash. You are less indignant (I mean you, the conference) than I expected at the contemptuous resistance to your guarantee, and at the ruthless disregard of all the consequences which may follow from a recommencement of war. I am almost persuaded by ~~the~~ Le Han that the K. of Holland was induced to take this rash step in the hope that it might end in the partition of Belgium. The K. being seen (—), the opposition press at Paris were running down Leopold arrangement as being English and anti-French, and believing in consequence that the French Gov. would not dare to uphold by its arms a course so unpopular in France, flattered himself that no French army would enter Belgium, unless for the purpose of joining in a partition of the Kingdom.

I have this instant been interrupted by a visit from Cas. P., who says that the P. of O. is arrived at (brest?), and that the French army, though it has this day crossed the frontier will hardly arrive in time to save Brussels. He regretted that the urgency of the circumstances had not allowed the French Gov. to wait for the resolution of the conference before they sent an army to defend Leopold. I said to him that I know not as yet what feeling has been created in England by the inyelligence of the entry of French troops into Belgium; that I was quite sure the opposition would make it a ground of attack upon ministers, and that if the ministers could be reconciled to it, it would be a very strong proof of their confidence in the honour and uprightness of the administration. I was disappointed when I told him that the naval officers thought it dangerous for a fleet to go up the Scheldt with all the batteries on the shore occupied by hostile troops.

As there are 2 extra messengers awaiting here, I send one home, though he will be the bearer of nothing important. Mr. Aubin(?) is just arrived from Rome.....

Granville.

Aug 19th 1831.

My dear Palmerston,

I was very much pleased to learn by your Letter of Wednesday which I received this Morning that you are so well satisfied with the passage in Sebastiani's Speech, and that you consider it as doing away the bad effect of what Soult had said. The King told me this Evening that Soult's colleagues had in the Council [Inter - - ?] him angrily for having given so unjust an impression of the Intentions of the French Government; & that Soult was much embarrassed & asserted that his Language had been incorrectly reported in the [Moniteur ?]. His Majesty has told me tonight that nothing could exceed the civility of the Prince of Orange & his People to every thing French, but he wished he would let the King Leopold hear some there of it [sic]; that his virulence against Leopold & against all the Belgians was such that he feared it would be long before the two Govts would be upon a footing of good neighbourhood, & he said unless the King of Holland was found by positive Engagement not to recommence Hostilities, the Belgians would be kept in a state of constant alarm. He hoped that the English Govt concurred in the necessity of obtaining the consent of the King of Holland to an armistice of at least 40 days duration, if not an Engagement at no Time to begin War whilst the five powers were employed in the Settlement of a Peace between the two kingdoms.

Sebastiani tells me that at the Hague the Dutch Govt were very much surprised that France gave military succour to Leopold, & that they made no secret of their expecting the French Troops to take possession of the Fortresses leaving the Dutch army to conquer Brussels & all the Country between that city & the Dutch Frontier.

I asked Werther today whether he knew which of the Belgian Fortresses the Prussians wished to be kept up, & which to be dismantled; he answered all dismantled, for if in the Hands of the Belgians, they would somehow or other fall into the Hands of the French. He admitted however that it might be well that Ostend should not be dismantled, for it might be wanted as a Point of communication with England. I am not surprised that young Perier should have taken our Instructions to ask for Phillippeville & Marienburg. I have my suspicions that [Latour ---- ?] has had similar Instructions. The Press & the Public are here clamorous to know what France is to obtain to indemnify her for the Expence of her Expedition into Belgium, & the Govt would

like to be able to answer the Restoration of an ancient boundary. The additional strength which such acquisition would give to France is not worth speaking of, & as I believe I have before told you that of we yield at all to the encroaching spirit of the French, we shall not know at what point to stop. You may however be sure that the Politicians of all parties, Royalists, Constitutionalists & Republicans are all longing for an opportunity of recovering this strip of Territory. They hope to obtain it by reshuffling the Cards, & until they get it, will consider no Peace as permanent.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

(Short P.S. concerning Greece follows)

Aug 21st 1851.

My dear Palmerston,

My Hasty Report of my conversation with Sebastiani will not give you much Reason to expect, that I shall in the execution of your Instructions be able to come to a plain & distinct understanding with the French Govt on the Evacuation of Belgium. I had an interview with Casimir Perier, before I went to Sebastiani. I read to him your despatch. He seemed really annoyed at the Peremptoriness with which we demanded the immediate Evacuation. He said we did not sufficiently consider the susceptibility of the French Publick, & that whilst they were doing all they could to enable the English Ministers to repel the attack of their opposition, we had not the same consideration for parliamentary Embarrassments of the French Ministry. I answered we asked only, that the French Govt would do that which they had themselves proposed, had engaged to do, & there could be surely nothing offensive to the Dignity or even the Vanity of the French Nation in that demand; he replied that the promptitude with which the demand was made before even the object of the Entrance of the French Troops had been accomplished, implied distrust of the Honesty of the Intentions of the French Government, & that after the expense which was incurred by France of putting into Motion the army, after the Service which it had rendered in preserving the Belgick Throne to Leopold, it was not unreasonable to ask that a satisfactory guarantee should be obtained that the King of Holland would not again recommence Hostilities, & that the French army should not be summoned to quit altogether the Country before such guarantee was given. He did not admit that the French army in Belgium were in any way brought to bear upon the question of the demolition of the Fortresses; but why, said he, if it be the Intention of the allied Powers to demolish the Fortresses, [exact ?] that nothing shall be determined on that Point until all the French Troops are withdrawn. Why this extreme [jealousy ?], when we are ordering our Troops to retire at the very moment that the Sovereign of the Country is entreating us not to leave it exposed to the Incursions of the Dutch, whilst her own army is reorganised. I begged him however to consider how much the Peace of Europe depended upon France not separating itself from the other Powers; I read to him that part of your private Letter in which you state that all that France wishes to be done, will be done, if they do not attempt to do it in a way humiliating to us. He promised that he would endeavour to

do what he could to meet our wishes, & when in answer to what he had mentioned of the Request of Leopold to retain some part of the French Troops for his protection, I said, that this Request ought rather to have been addressed to the conference than to the French Govt. He fully acquiesced in the justice of that observation. I am however seriously apprehensive, notwithstanding the sincere & anxious desire of Perier to preserve Peace. There is but one Point of difference; the French Government will not admit that the four Powers retain the Right, which they exercised in conjunction with the King of the Netherlands, of deliberating with the Belgick Govt on the question of the Belgick Fortresses, excluding France from having any voice in those deliberations. But without in the party yielding on this abstract Question, is it not possible to avoid War? From what Baron Werther told me this Morning, it would seem that the French Govt are not aiming at such a general Sweeping off ~~the~~ of the Belgick Fortresses as I had apprehended. Baron Werther asked Sebastiani yesterday, which were the Fortresses, of which [atour --- ?] was instructed to ask from the Belgian Govt the demolition. He named five, Charleroi, Mons, [Ath ?], Tournay, & Menin. Werther is convinced that the Prussian Military authorities would not only consent to the demolition of these Fortresses, but would even recommend that they should be demolished. Why, having communicated to France the Protocol recording the Intention of the Four Powers to arrange with the Belgick Govt the dismantling of some of their Fortresses, should they not now communicate the names of those which they intend to raze. There would be no question of your signing a Treaty to which you will not put your Hand. Sebastiani said to me over & over again, if you, Lord Granville, will only say that the English Govt will not prevent the King Leopold from making an arrangement with us, we shall be contented. I am the more anxious that we should not get into a quarrel on this Point, because I find Baron Werther very uneasy at the notion that the Fortress Question should lead to a Rupture, & I am not without apprehension that Prussia, the Power who alone could make head against France on the side of Belgium, may not be disposed to enter very heartily into our quarrel.

I am

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GG/GR/207

Paris

Aug 21st 1831

(Letter dealing only with the difficulties of Perier concerning Hereditary Peerage.)

GG/GR/208

Paris

Aug 22nd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I did not mention in my publick despatch that Sebastiani was extremely anxious I should impress upon your mind that the Negotiation with Leopold respecting the dismantling his Fortresses, had been begun before the Dutch Invasion of Belgium, & consequently before any notion existed of a French Army entering that Kingdom. On this, however, & on all the other Points regarding the Evacuation, regarding the Fortresses, he said, he would write fully to Talleyrand tomorrow. I assure you that I argued with & urged both Sebastiani & Perier for nearly four hours yesterday; & I really believe they have said as much in their Reply this morning, as considering the feeling both in the Chamber of Deputies & in the Publick they can venture to say. After the rash, & arrogant declaration made in the King's Speech that the Fortresses will be destroyed, the Ministers cannot tell the Chamber that the question is wholly in the Hands of the four Powers & the Belgian Government - they would be hooted from the Tribune. You may say this is their own Fault, why did they make such a [?] Clap Trap Speech. Very true, & I doubt not they sorely repent it, but the difficulty is not on that account less embarrassing. Is there however no mezzo Termine; cannot Sir R. Adair, without as the French propose co-operating with [Latour ?], settle the question with Leopold.

Sebastiani had a duel with [Lamargue ?] this Morning; but he did not tell me the particulars, & I have scarcely seen any other Person.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/209

Paris

Aug 26th 1831

10 P.M.

My dear Palmerston,

Sebastiani arrived here just as I was going to dinner to apprise me of the decision or rather the indecision of the Council respecting the 34th Protocol. When I went to the Foreign Office this morning, I had no expectation of hearing the strong objections to it stated by Sebastiani, & I regret that I had no opportunity of concurring with Cas. Perier before the Council met; as however no decision has been taken, & the question is still left open, I am not without hopes of Perier taking a different view of the question from that which has been suggested to him by Sebastiani, & I trust therefore that you also will have a little patience on your side of the water, & take no Resolution in consequence of the hesitation shown here about adhering to the Protocol.

With regard to the dangers which encompass Leopold, & the necessity of his having the temporary protection of French Troops against the Orangists, Adair will probably enable you to judge whether these statements are founded, or whether they are ~~merely~~ only a pretext for prolonging the occupation of Belgium. I cannot but think that the French Govt really apprehend, if they retire immediately, that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands may be again reestablished under the Orange dynasty & the Fortresses be preserved as a Rampart against France.

(Remainder of Letter deals with Peerage problem.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

Aug 27th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

The State of Things is not so promising as you imagined at the Time you wrote your private Letter of the 25th which I received this Morning. You have given to the declaration of the French Government an Interpretation, not intended by them, & which the words of it will not justify. You speak of my despatches announcing that orders have been given for the Evacuation of Belgium by the French; whereas the declaration of Sebastiani, as reported in my despatch of the 22nd ult only announces that the French army will return within the French Frontier, as soon as a satisfactory Security has been obtained, that Belgium will not be again invaded by the Dutch; so that even if they acknowledged, that the Engagement demanded from the King of Holland, would when obtained, be a satisfactory Security, they could not be expected to give the orders, which you seem to think have already been given for the Evacuation of Belgium, until they have received advice of the King of the Netherlands having contracted that Engagement. But my despatch of last night will inform you, that doubting, or pretending to doubt the adequacy of the proposed security, the French Govt have hesitated to approve the 34th Protocol, & have suspended their decision on that Point until your answer shall be received to their last communication. I told Sebastiani today, whom I found in bed at six o'clock with a Bad Headache that I had no official answer to communicate, but that I learnt by a private Letter from you that you were pleased with the first part of his declaration; that you could not consent to Adair being empowered to treat with [Latour ?] about the Fortresses; but that you were doing all you could in your own way to meet the Wishes of the French Government. With regard to the views & opinions, & wishes of Prussia on the question of the Belgick Fortresses, you have a very different Impression from that which prevails here. I have this Morning been again to Werther to question him on the subject. His Court, he says are desirous for the early Evacuation of Belgium by the French Troops, but having consulted their best military opinions, they are most anxious for the demolition of all the Belgick Fortresses, & he, Werther, seems to dread that by our Refusal to treat with France on the subject, their demolition may be delayed, the occupation of Belgium by the French prolonged, & that we shall get into a war with France whilst these strong places are in their Possession,

or before they are dismantled. He argues, & I confess I think his argument good, that when once the Four Powers consented to the Separation of Belgium from Holland, it was idle to consider the Belgick Fortresses as a Barrier for the defence of Holland & Germany. They were a valuable Barrier when we were assured that the Possession of them from Sentiment, Habit & Interest would be united with you against France, but in the Hands of a King of Belgium, they would be a rampart for France rather than a Barrier against her. Charleroi, he said for instance, which is impregnable would be invaluable to France as a Protection to her Flanders Frontier. The War Party here declaim against the dismantling of the Fortresses, but the Ministers have so [?] about ~~them~~ their demolition, that their pride will not allow them to leave the Question entirely with the Four Powers & the Belgick Govt. I find Count [Appony ?] most anxious that we should not get into a Quarrel with France by perservering in the rigorous exclusion of her from all participation in the conferences on this subject.

(Para concerned with affairs in Portugal.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

Aug 29th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I know not whether Marshall Gerard misinterpreted his Instructions, or Leopold misunderstood him, but it is clear that the order issued by the French Govt for the retreat of their army from Belgium was not unqualified, as Adair was led to believe from Leopold's Conversation. However as the Ministers here do not feel it necessary to deny the Truth of the declaration made in the British Parliament, you will reap all the advantage of having silenced the Tories & disappointing the Hopes which they had founded on the expected misunderstanding between the two Govts relative to the Evacuation of Belgium. I think Leopold's Request to have for a limited time the protection of a French Force whilst he is reorganising his own army, is so reasonable, that your opponents will be able to make no case against you with the Country, if in common with the other Powers, you accede to this Request. The Language of the Dutch Gazette, the evasiveness of the answers of the Dutch Govt, the refusal of their commanders to evacuate Places, such as [Capitcleden ?] & [Verlaab ?], which they did not possess during the previous armistice, all come powerfully in aid of this demand for protection. No one can doubt that the Terms of Peace must be imposed by the Five Powers. I am inclined to hope that this Govt will not uphold any reasonable Pretensions of the Belgians.

~~XXXXXX~~ 9 PPM.

A Messenger is just arrived with your private Letter, and a Copy of your despatch to Adair about the Fortresses. I quite agree in all your Reasoning that as these Fortresses were raised for the purpose of defending other Nations besides Belgium against an attack from France, that the King of Belgium has not the Right to enter into any Engagement to dismantle them but with the consent of the Powers who contributed to the Erection of them; but as previous to the last Invasion by the Dutch, the Belgian Govt had testified a disinclination to demolish any of these Fortresses, or even to adopt the April Protocol of the four Powers considering the great obligations which Belgium owes to France, nothing less than her existence as a separate Power from Holland, France may reasonably expect that if the other Powers consent to their demolition, the Belgick Govt shall not interpose its veto to a measure which the King of the French has declared to his People will be

carried into effect.

I am always quoting ^eWerther to you, because you quote Prussia as one of the Powers, who especially protest against [latour -- ?] Negotiation. But Werther was with me this morning, not only most impatient that the question of dismantling should be agreed upon, but saying he should not be easy until the fortifications of all of them were actually razed.

(Passage concerning the Pope & another about Portugal)

I found [Meutrand ?] today at Cas. Perier. He is one of those, who with Talleyrand is always talking of the folly of not [partitioning ?] Belgium, & as he is going back immediately to England, I suppose he had been to Perier to persuade him to enter into their views, but I do not find that the French Govt are the least disposed to adopt that Policy; Sebastiani, whose influence in foreign politics is now I think unbounded over Perier, this very day repeated to me over & over again his determination to support Leopold, & I am persuaded thinks that France will more easily thus govern Belgium, than by an annexation of it to France.

I am,

My dear Palmerston,

Yours most sincerely

Granville.

Aug 31st 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I told Sebastiani today (I could not see him yesterday) that if Talleyrand had represented the British Govt to have agreed to a French Force being for a Time placed at the disposal of Leopold, he, Talleyrand, was not authorised to make such a Representation, for that I had heard from you that the opinion of the Cabinet had not yet been pronounced. He did not seem the least dissatisfied with this declaration. He said, he was quite certain that the two Govts would on this as well as on all other Points connected with the settlement of the Belgick & Holland Question go on harmoniously; & he instanced as a proof of his disposition to accede to the wishes of the British Govt [Latour ?] having only pressed for Leopold's adherence to the April Protocol, & the Instruction to Belliard to urge the Belgick Govt to accept the armistice proposed in the 34 Protocol. He also took to himself some credit for his peremptory Rejection of the Secret article proposed by the Belgick Govt relative to the 18 articles of the Separation.

I did not enter at all with him into the Question of the amount of the Force to be left for a Time to protect Leopold, except for appearance and publick Impression, I cannot think it signifies whether this force be nine thousand, or fifteen thousand; if the French Govt mean to play false, the former number, backed as it is would be by an hundred thousand men within two days March, would answer their purpose as well as fifteen thousand.

Sebastiani told me that Adair was authorised in conjunction with Belliard, to negotiate the Exchange of the occupation of Antwerp for Venlo. Perhaps (as I have not heard from either you or Adair that such a negotiation has been authorised) Talleyrand has in this, as in his Report of our having consented to the French Force being left to Protect Leopold, anticipated the Intentions of the Conference.

I see Londerry has been again questioning in the H. of Lords about Belgium. I wonder Grey vouchsafes to answer.

(Passage concerning the Peerage, Poland & Italy.)

Yours very sincerely

Granville.

Sept 2nd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I was at the Foreign Office this Morning between ten & eleven, but Sebastiani had already gone out. I shall endeavour to see him later in the day. I had a few minutes Conversation last night with Casimir Perier; he was very anxious to learn the result of [?] communications; I told him that I had heard nothing official from you on the subject, but that I understood we were disposed to think that the Presence of a French force in Belgium was not necessary to support the authority of Leopold. He said, if he could feel assured that the Country would remain undisturbed by Orange Insurrections during the reorganisation of the Belgian army, he could have no wish to leave a French Corps at the disposal of Leopold; he hoped I was convinced that the French Govt had no arriere Pensee, & that the only object they had in view was to bring matters to a prompt & definitive Settlement. I said that whatever might be the disposition of the Ministry, I was sure the public opinion would be strong in England against an indefinite occupation of any part of Belgium by French Troops; that Count Sebastiani had indeed talked of a Month as the most extended Period of their Stay, but the shorter was the Period fixed, the greater would be the activity of the Belgian Govt in reorganising their own army. And now I cannot but express to you my anxiety that neither on this point, nor on that of the Fortresses, we should deal very rigorously with Casimir Perier's Ministry. I learn that the Duke of Wellington has given a military opinion that none of the Fortresses can be dispensed with; if we act on that opinion, or even in the Spirit, though not exactly to the Letter of that opinion, we shall get into a war, & with some Imputation on our good Faith; but is the opinion of the Duke of Wellington on this Point unprejudiced? Is he not biassed by Feelings of Regret at the demolition of Works, the construction of which he had counselled as well as superintended, after having advised the expenditure of such enormous Sums in fortifying these Places. He cannot but be reluctant to acknowledge that since the splitting of the ill-assorted Kingdom of the Netherlands, they could be sources of danger, rather than Security to Holland & the North of Germany. I am therefore more inclined to trust to the Prussian Military authorities; but indeed without

knowing any thing of military matters, it would seem that considering the political as well as the geographical Position of Belgium, these Fortresses cannot fail to fall into the Hands of France, & become a Rampart for her, instead of a Barrier for other Countries against French Invasion. If no other Security is to be found against France than the Preservation of these Fortresses, the Duke of Wellington, when the Belgick Revolution began, ought, even at the Risk of war, to have aided the King of the Netherlands to recover his Revolced Provinces. But if his opinion should now govern the determinations of the Conference, what excuse have we to make to France for deluding her with false Hopes. Why did we communicate our Intention to demolish some of the Fortresses & authorise the making Publick that Communication? You state in your despatch that the Protocol was communicated to the French Govt because it was thought that an official knowledge of the Intention therein announced might be useful to the Govt of France; those Intentions are in the Protocol declared to be the adoption of a change of system for the military defence of the Low Countries, that is, that the unanimous Recognition of the Inviolability of the Belgian Territory offering a Security which did not previously exist, a part of the Fortresses erected under different circumstances might now be razed. Now I have my apprehensions that the opinion of the Duke of Wellington may induce you not to act according to the spirit of that Protocol; that is that you may consent only to the demolition of one or two places; but which partial demolition would in fact not be that change of system for the military defence of the Low Countries, which you announced to France. If such should be the case, your official communication of the Intentions announced in the Protocol, so far from being useful, will cause great embarrassment to the French Government. That arrogant mode of proclaiming it in the King's Speech has added to their Embarrassment is true, but even if it had been declared only in Terms such as the Communication of the Protocol would have justified, & your demolition is to be so partial & inconsiderable as to show that your system of defence is not changed, they may fairly I think accuse you "of keeping the promise to their Ear but breaking it in their Hope". And they will say on finding that you have acted in deference to the opinions of the Duke of Wellington, that he ought to have been consulted before signing the April Protocol, & that there should have been added to it, the Proviso, if the Duke of Wellington shall approve of it.

I feel the more anxious on this subject, because I have always told Perier & Sebastiani, that they might rely on our fairly fulfilling the expectations raised by the Communication of our Protocol, if they would not [mar ?] their own Purpose, by mixing up with it the question of their army occupying Belgium.

And now with regard to a French Force being allowed by the Conference to remain for a limited time in Belgium to secure Leopold, until his army is somewhat reestablished, against Insurrection fomented by Dutch Money & Intrigue. I do not agree with you that because Leopold says a foreign force is for a short time necessary to secure the Country from disturbance, by such declaration he avows himself unfit to be King of Belgium. The sudden Irruption of a numerous army into the very Heart of the Country, when its Govt relying on the guarantee of an armistice (which guarantee though in a career of success had been obliged to respect) were totally unprepared for Resistance, had disorganised the civil as well as the military administration of the Kingdom. Consider now fairly & candidly the situation of Leopold. He had scarcely taken possession of the Throne when this Invasion from Holland burst upon him, The Orange Party, though very inferior in numbers, is active & always prepared in certain districts to rise; in other Parts are discontented Republicans connected with the Propagandists of France. Is not some military force requisite to compress all these Elements of disturbance? And is it unreasonable in Leopold to ask for the temporary assistance of a foreign Force whilst his own army is reorganising. I really believe that French Govt has no other object in view, when they urge the conference to consent to Leopold's Request, than to preserve the Country from Anarchy, & it is not that a very justifiable object. Do you think that if the Orangists & Leopoldists were fighting close to their own Frontier, that the French People could be kept quiet, & that Perier's Ministry could stand a day, unmoved Spectators of the Contest, no, a general war must be the consequence, and it is because they wish to avoid being driven into War, that they wish to keep for a Time such a Force in Belgium as shall overcome the orangists, & other discontented subjects.

Having now given vent to my opinions & feelings, I am ready to acknowledge that we are all to a certain degree influenced by the atmosphere in which we live, & that seeing Cas, Perier so much in earnest to keep the Peace, & so annoyed when he finds us dissatisfied with what he

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had hoped we should think Reasonable, that I am less prone than you are to suspect the good faith of the Govt. I see evidently that Bagot is influenced in his feelings by those with whom he has to deal. He does not feel indignant as I do at the Equivocation, & Insolence of the British Govt, & perhaps, if he saw this Letter, he might feel indignant at my disposition to justify the views & Intentions of France.

Yours very sincerely

Granville.

Paris
9 P.M. Sept 2nd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

The Messenger is just arrived with the 35th & 36th Protocols, & with your separate despatch to me giving an account of General [Baudrend's ?] Conference with you. Your reply to General [Baudrend's ?] is an answer to the long Letter which I wrote to you this Morning, & though I still retain my own private opinion that it would be politick to allow the French Force to remain a limited & short time in Belgium, with reference to the state of Things in France as well as in that Country, yet I am glad to be furnished with so able an exposition of the arguments against my own opinion, & of which it will be my duty to avail myself in my discussions with Perier & Sebastiani. I think however you underrate a little the danger to be apprehended from the Change of Ministry here. The free Press will not control the warlike disposition of the new Minister; on the contrary it will halloo it on, as the Times is disposed to force you into war.

I have not been able to see Sebastiani, though I have made many attempts to find him in the course of the day. I therefore write to you today no publick despatch. I will send an extra Messenger tomorrow.

Yours ever sincerely,

Granville.

Sept 3rd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I had begun writing to you an official Report of Sebastiani's conversation, upon my communicating to him the Protocol of the four Powers, when I received from him the enclosed Note. I have thought it might in compliance with his Request to ~~write~~ abstain from stating in a publick despatch the bitter complaints he uttered respecting the Contents of the Protocol. I hope, on mature Reflection and after consulting with his Colleagues, he will be less disposed to complain of the hostile Spirit in which the Protocol is drawn up. He this morning called it a Revival of the Holy alliance. He said France was considered not a a Power acting in friendly concert with the other great Powers for the preservation of the Peace of Europe but as an Enemy to be kept down & controlled by a League of Confederated States - and that the Notion that the new Sovereign of Belgium was placed in the Position of the King of the Netherlands, & that he inherited all the Engagements of his Netherland Majority, could never be admitted by the French Govt.

I have seen Sebastiani again this Evening for a few moments; I found him calmer on the subject of the Protocol, but still lamenting that Lord Grey's Govt were adopting the Holy alliance Principles of the Duke of Wellington. He told me that he had inserted the word momentenement in the article of tomorrow's Moniteur, & that this word would be a triumphant answer to the attack of the Tories in the British Parliament. He showed me an amendment he had made to the declaration which Adair had drawn up for the Belgick Govt to make to France through [Latour --?]; in the amended form Leopold specifies the five fortresses (Charleroi, Mons, Ath, Tournay & Menin) for the demolition of which, in accordance with the principle of the April Protocol, he will enter into negotiation with the Four Powers. I told him I thought the specifying the Fortresses would be considered inadmissible.

Yours ever sincerely,

Granville.

Sept 5th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

In the course of my conversation with Sebastiani this day, he very frequently alluded to the article in the Moniteur of yesterday respecting the Retreat of the army from Belgium, & the corps of 12,000 men left at the disposal of Leopold; he seemed to be endeavouring to extract from me an acknowledgement that considering the difficulties of Leopold's Position, & the danger to be apprehended from French Recruits as well as orangist Partizans it would have been most imprudent to have refused the Request of the Belgick Government. I told him that I did not suspect, that the French Govt had any other object in leaving these 12,000 men in Belgium than that which they professed, not did I doubt their Readiness to withdraw them when informed by Leopold that he could dispense with their assistance; but ~~the~~ the Impression of the Publick must be, that by the military Intervention of France a Government was imposed on the Country against the Will of its Inhabitants, & that I could not imagine after all the Enthusiasm with which Leopold had been received in his Progress through his dominions that he could not rely upon his civil guards to preserve the Internal Tranquillity. Sebastiani contended that though a great majority of the Belgians might be in favour of Leopold, a few turbulent & discontented Individuals might create confusion; that in reorganising the army, many officers must be displaced, who in resentment for the loss of their Commissions would be ready to join any Party against the Government. Why, he said, risk the Country falling into a state of Anarchy, when the consequences of it be all those Evils, which the Conferences in London having been [Sic] working for the last ten months to avert. He added, you know France never will consent (even if we its present Ministers were so inclined) to the Reestablishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Result therefore of the overthrow of Leopold must necessarily be either a general war or a partition of the Belgick Provinces. The King of Holland, Prince Talleyrand & Messrs [Baring ?] & Lebouchere look to the realisation of the latter alternative, but we do not wish, nor do we think it can be either the wish or Interest of the English Govt that such Partition should take place. Sebastiani is much dissatisfied with Talleyrand. When I told him how Talleyrand had insisted on an armistice of three weeks, & was with difficulty persuaded to agree to the six weeks armistice, he said he

had never heard a word of it, & that no Instruction had ever been sent to him which could warrant the bringing forward that Proposition. He insinuated that it arose from a Dutch & [Baring ?] Bias, or from his being 79 years old.

He informed me that on Friday last he sent off his Instructions to Talleyrand respecting the Plan of a definitive Treaty, but he did not tell me what those Instructions were; I rather collected from him that he expected opposition to his views from Bulow, for he talked of the difficulties which might arise from Prussia not having adhered in an unqualified way to the eighteen articles of Separation.

(Para about France and Spain)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/217

Paris

Sept 7 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I had just finished the accompanying despatches, & the Messenger's Carriage with his Post-Horses were in the Court Yard, when yours of the 5th arrived. I will not now attempt to enter upon the subject of the Instructions sent to me, but, although the gentler Mode recommended by you of requiring the Evacuation of Belgium has been adopted, & although thereby a violent explosion may be avoided, I have my fears that the French Govt will demur to the immediate Retirement of Gen. Barrois's 12,000 men into France. I believe they are really afraid an Orange Insurrection will break out, if Leopold at this moment is entirely left to his own Resources; & I also believe that being determined, as Sebastiani told me this day, to resist at the hazard of a general war the Re-establishment of the Orange Family in Belgium, they consider the continuance for a short Period of the Corps of Barrois in Belgium as their safeguard against such war. It is very easy to prove their Inconsistency, & how they abandon their Principles to suit their Interests & Convenience, but if they withdraw their Troops, & an Insurrection of Orangists should overthrow Leopold, neither the Chamber of Deputies, nor the Publick would forgive the Minister.

The Belgians are evidently throwing themselves into the Hands of France, & it was because I never cherished the Expectation, that the Sovereign of that Country, whoever he might be, would do otherwise than rely chiefly upon France for support that I belived it for the Interest of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ all Europe to raze as many of the Belgick Fortresses as possible near the French Frontier.

Pozzo is absent I know what where exactly at this moment, & the Time of his return uncertain; therefore of course Count _____, the chief Secretary will execute Lievens Instructions, but Apponi is shooting in the Country, & does not return until tomorrow night; so that I think we must adjourn to Friday our communications to the French Government. You are quite wrong in supposing that our Prussian here will be desirous of giving a peremptory character to our communication; he is very anxious & determined about Luxembourg, & about Maestricht, but thinks that a week or two of delay in evacuating Belgium by French Troops, or the insisting upon keeping up of any Belgick Fortresses is not matter of real moment.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/218

Paris

Sept 9th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I will transmit tomorrow by Special Messenger my official Report of what we have done in Execution of the Instructions received here from London respecting the Memorandum, & of the Result. I have not time to write at any length before the departure of the ordinary Messenger of tonight, but I will not delay telling you that Perier & Sebastiani will tomorrow propose to the Council (& their proposition will without doubt be accepted) that a notification shall be made to Leopold, & to the Conference by Prince Talleyrand, that the Corps of Gen. Barrois, now at the disposal of Leopold, will on the 27th begin to Retreat into France, & that on the 30th not a single French Soldier will be left in Belgium. Now, before you could draw up your formal Protocol requiring instantaneous Evacuation, send it here, & have your answer, the 30th will be very near at hand. Is it worthwhile to Quarrel, or even to squabble about the five or so remaining days. I pressed hard for the 20th, then the 25th, but the difficulty of the Peerage Question in the Chamber of Deputies they asserted, made them most anxious not to unpopularize themselves on a question of foreign Politics before they came to the vote on the Peerage.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

Sept 10th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I have received a letter from Adair full of fury at the Treachery of the Belgick Govt in signing the declaration of consent to the demolition of the five Fortresses, & apprehending that it is the beginning of a hostile separation between France & England. I confess, though I had before expressed my objection to naming the five Fortresses, I cannot see that it will practically interfere with or in any way affect the free deliberation of the Powers, & of the Belgick Govt in the selection of the Fortresses to be demolished. France admits that the concert of the four Powers is necessary for effecting the demolition of the five places named; if that concert be withheld, there is an End of the obligation contracted by Leopold towards France.

I think you are not disposed to be indulgent towards the Perier Ministry, or to make allowances for all their difficulties; what you say in your despatch enclosing the memorandum, that every Govt is bound to be strong enough to fulfil its engagements, & if not, it ought to retire is very true, but it does not follow that there may not be cases in which you may allow them a latitude in the Interpretation of their Promises without sacrificing your own essential Interests. You seem less alarmed than I am when there is danger of this Ministry being overthrown. I think war will inevitably follow a change which shall give ascendancy to the Mouvement Party; not that they will begin by a declaration of war against all the Powers of Europe, but because they will pursue their [professed ?] System, & encourage instead of repressing Revolution in all other Countries.

I am not quite well, & am very much tired with writing, so adieu

Yours sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/220

Paris

Sept 12th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I have not been able to see Sebastiani this day; he has been all the morning occupied with the Commission of the Chambers who are examining the Budget. This Messenger therefore carries nothing but two very insignificant short despatches. I hear today from Adair that Leopold proposes even a less distant day than the 25th for the French Troops to retire from his dominions. So, I hope the question of Evacuation is satisfactorily settled. It appears that [M---?] represented to Adair that the Belgick declaration was connected with me. I must remind Sebastiani that I always objected to any particular fortresses being named in the declaration.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/221

Paris

Sept 16th 1831

(Letter dealing with Portuguese affairs.)

GC/GR/222

Paris

Sept 16th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I had two or three evenings ago a long conversation with the King, in which he expressed very strongly his determination to adhere to the present pacifick System of [Light ?]. He said nothing should induce him to attempt the character of conqueror; he would not be a Napoleon manque. He said, he was very anxious for the settlement of the Belgick Question, but he hoped the conference would take into consideration the possibility of leaving to Holland a strong frontier giving her possession of both banks of the Scheldt, but at the same time dispossessing her of the Power of wantonly inflicting incalculable Evil on a vast Portion of the Belgick Territory. He said, mere neglect on the part of the Dutch authorities would expose to ruin a large Tract of Country.

I am disappointed not to receive a Line from you last night relative to the answers given by the French Govt to the confidential Memorandum. Talleyrand however writes that the conference are well satisfied. Not so the opposition in the Chambers, which has been much stimulated today by the News of the capture of Warsaw. The Stenographe which I enclose contains the Introduction to the Interpolations which are promised for Monday next.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

I have got a Return of my grippe. I am sneezing & coughing continually; I hope however I shall not be confined, or [--- ? ---].

GC/GR/223

Paris

Sept 19th 1831

(Letter dealing with internal problems in France.)

GC/GR/224

Paris

Sept 23rd 1831

(Letter dealing with Greek & Portuguese affairs.)

GC/GR/225

Paris

Sept 30th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(Para. referring to Reform Bill in House of Lords.)

The Ministers are much disappointed at the Conference having as yet taken no measures to secure the prolongation of the armistice. The Publick here universally believe that the Dutch will on the 10th of October recommence the war, & the Govt has difficulty in quietening the apprehensions of their Friends. You seem however to be proceeding vigorously by taking the question out of the Hands of the contending parties. The Haut arbitrage is the only mode of settling it, but still I doubt whether the Consent of either will be obtained to the award of the conference before the 10th of October.

(Paras. dealing with French & Portuguese affairs.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/226

Paris

October 17th 1831.

(Letter dealing with French politics.)

GC/GR/227

Paris

October 19th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

You cannot be more sincerely desirous to obtain the Consent of the Belgians to your Treaty, than are the French Ministers. They have done well to send Marshall Gerard to Brussels; I urged strongly, that Belliard, who was known to have recommended arrangements more favourable to Belgium, than those which have been now settled, could not speak with the same authority & effect as a Person specially deputed by Louis Philippe & his Govt to press the Acceptance of the 24 articles. Sebastiani is not without fears about the Debt article, & he apprehends that if the Chambers should reject it, Leopold will cut & run. His Brother reproaches him with his folly for getting into these troubled waters, & he frequently talks with Regret of the Quiet of Claremont.

(Passage concerning Poland & Russia.)

I am

My dear Palmerston

Yours sincerely

Granville.

October 21 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I have little more to say than congratulate you upon the Prospect which our accounts from Brussels this day afford of the acceptance of the Treaty by the Belgians. You have worked hard, & it must be satisfactory to you to reflect how much your labours have contributed to consolidate the general Peace of Europe.

[Letton ?] dined with me this day, & he positively denies that he ever wrote that the French Govt considered the Debt article as a proposition & not as a Question fully decided. He says, he has on the contrary represented that King Louis Philippe & his Ministers, Perier, Sebastiani & Sault have uniformly told him that the 24 articles were indivisible, & irrevocably settled, & that he had warned his Govt of the serious Responsibility they would incur by rejecting the Treaty of even accepting it with qualifications. The French Ministers have acted honestly & zealously in the Business.

(Passage about Palmella going to London.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

You gave a letter of Introduction to me, to a gentleman of the name of [Dealtry ?]; pray tell me something respecting him. He talked I thought to me rather strangely of Talleyrand, & Prince Leopold having his house watched by their spies, & of Louis Philippe looking at his windows when he passed his house & he has desired me to present him at Court. Is he at all deranged? What is your Rule about giving such Letters of Introduction?

GC/GR/229

Paris

October 24 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I heard from Adair this Morning that he expected there would be a majority of 8 or 10 in favour of the acceptance of the Treaty. Belliard in his Letter to Sebastiani estimated somewhat higher the Majority; about 20. We hope to have the News of its acceptance by the Telegraph tomorrow morning.

(Paras. concerning French politics & relations with Portugal.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/230

Paris

October 28th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

Since I wrote my despatch about the possible Entrance of the French Troops into Belgium, I learn that at the Instigation of Pozzo, Sebastiani intends writing to Talleyrand to obtain previous Sanction? from the conference of the French Troops advancing to meet the Dutch army in case the King of Holland should be mad enough to recommence Hostilities. I am glad that you are so well pleased with the French Govt. They really deserve Kudos for the spirited Manner in which they have pushed the Belgians to accept the Treaty.

(Reference to Greek Question.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/231

Paris

Oct 31 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I have an headache today, but luckily I have little to write either publick or private. Our accounts from Brussels are always to the same purpose. Belliard continues to write that the Chamber is still debating, but that there is no doubt of a considerable Majority for the acceptance of the 24 articles.

(Rest of Letter deals with Prince Paul of Wirtemberg, Greek and Turkish matters.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/232

Paris

Nov 4th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(Paras. dealing with English Economists' visit, and Greek & Turkish affairs.)

We are impatient for the acceptance of the 24 articles by the Dutch King. The French will immediately on receiving the Intelligence begin to dislocate their army concentrated on the Belgian Frontier, & will very shortly proceed to disband a part of their 400,000 men. The example of Austria has done much good.

(Reference to Bristol Riots & his Govt.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/233

Paris
Nov 7th 1831

(This Letter deals with Civil disorder in England,
Anglo-French Commercial Relations, & Russo-Polish
affairs.)

GC/GR/234

Paris
Nov 11th 1831

(Deals with outbreak of Cholera, Anglo-French commerce,
& the Slave Trade.)

GC/GR/235

Paris
Nov 14th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(First para. deals with Anglo-French Tariffs.)

I never saw Sebastiani so pleased as he is with the
Course which the conference have determined to adopt.
The opposition journals have been twitting the Ministers
with the Reluctance of the continental Powers to acknow-
ledge Leopold, & have been arguing that this Reluctance
indicates that, a Secret Encouragement is given by them
to the Resistance of the Dutch King. The signature of
the Treaty between the five Powers & Leopold will be a
triumphant answer to their attacks.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/236

Paris
Nov 14th 1831

(Short Letter dealing with trade & right of search.)

Nov 18 1831

My dear Palmerston,

The Messenger from Calais having arrived last night without the official Box, & no Letter being found in the Bag either publick or private from you to me I am led to conclude that this said Box, filled with interesting Information relative to the Treaty between the five Powers & Leopold has by some mistake been forgotten; Lord Durham attributes to the same cause, his not having heard from Grey. The Courier however of Wednesday, which reached Paris this morning asserts with an air of official authority that the Treaty was signed on the preceding Evening. I read a Letter from [Mareuil ?] this morning, which gives little Hope of the Dutch King yielding. He says that Bagot is really ill with vexation & disappointment, & that the People of Holland are much excited, & prepared to resist all attempt to control the conduct of their Sovereign. What will be your next step in the way of coercion, for if the five Powers do not mean to make themselves laughed at & despised by all Europe, they must proceed towards the completion of their work. The King Louis Philippe seems anxious that his Troops may not in any way be called upon to take any share in [executive ?] Measures. Has the Conference any Thoughts of the Ministers of all the five Powers quitting the Hague ? Or do they think that suspending all commercial Intercourse between the three Powers of England, France & Prussia, & Holland will impress the Dutch with the necessity of agreeing to the Treaty ?

(Rest of Letter deals with Navigation Treaty discussions.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/238

Paris

Nov 21st 1831

My dear Palmerston,

Your Special Messenger who arrived here late on Friday night made ample amends for the barrenness of the Bag of which the ordinary Messenger of the preceding night had been the Bearer. The Treaty between the five Powers & Belgium has delighted the King, & his Ministers; it gives them a triumph over their opponents, who twitting them with their credulity in the false professions of the continental Powers, insisted that the King of Holland was secretly encouraged by Russia & Prussia to withhold his acceptance of the Treaty of Separation.

(Remainder of Letter concerns Portugal, Turkish-Greek affairs, & Reform Bill.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/239

Paris

Nov 25th 1831

(Letter deals with Insurrection of workmen at Lyons & movements of French troops to handle the situation.)

GC/GR/240

Paris

Nov 25th 1831

(Letter concerning Anglo-French trade.)

GC/GR/241

Paris

Nov 27th 1831

(Letter with reference to Slave Trade Convention & riots at Lyons.)

GC/GR/242

Paris

Nov 28th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(Most of Letter refers to liberation of Slaves.)

Sebastiani in the few words that passed between us on the King of Holland's Message to his States General, & his newly contracted Loan of 80 Million of Francs, urged the Expediency of instituting a Blockade of his Kingdom by Land as well as by Sea. He is very impatient for something to be done by the conference.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/243

Paris

Nov 30th 1831

(Deals with Trade & foreign affairs other than of Holland and Belgium.)

GC/GR/244

Paris

Dec 2nd 1831

(Short Note dealing with Trade & Customs.)

Dec 9th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(First part of Letter about Slave Trade, Portugal, etc.)

I do not like the delay of the King of Prussia in sending his Ratification of the Treaty, & there is something suspicious in the Clamours of Metternich about 60 or 70 Raggamuffins under [Ach - - ?] Murat (which is the amount of this foreign Corps) before the Emperor of Austria ratifies. Any appearance of Reluctance to acknowledge Leopold on the part of the three continental Powers will confirm the K of Holland in his Resistance. Leopold however had better not afford any pretext for these delays, his admitting Murat into his service was ill judged, & he cannot too soon give him his congé.

I am anxious to learn what is the real Truth about these [Huningue ?] fortifications; France acts very foolishly, if she forces the four powers to a joint remonstrance, upon a question, in itself not perhaps very important, but of which the French People will not like to be reminded. I believe I mentioned to you that Sebastiani assured me that he had closely questioned the Chef de [?] on the subject, who positively denied that there was the least foundation for the Report which had reached the Austrian ambassador.

What delays the Conclusion of the Fortress demolition Treaty? [Letton ?], who arrived here yesterday from Brussels was apprized of the fortresses which it was proposed to demolish, & said the razing Philippeville & Marienberg would expose the Perier Minister Sic to bitter attacks from their parliamentary opponents. I counselled him not to communicate to this Govt what he knew, until the arrangement was finally concluded & officially notified, but though he was willing to be silent towards the Ministers, he said, if the subject were mentioned by Louis Philippe, he should not think himself at liberty to conceal from them which were the fortresses it was intended to destroy.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/246

Paris

Dec 12th 1831

(Letter dealing entirely with Spain & Portugal.)

GC/GR/247

Paris

Dec 16th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

My Conversation this day with Sebastiani about Marienberg & Phillippeville reminded me of former Belgick discussions, which he used to preface by "c'est une affaire tres grave" - words which he repeated over and over again this morning. I have been prepared for this explosion; my conversation with [Letton ?] led me to think that the Belgick Govt fearful of offending the French Govt were trying to persuade the King & his Ministers that nothing short of Le couteau sur le Gorge would have made them consent to the demolition of these two places. That [?] in the King's Speech at the opening of the Session has brought on him & his Govt much mortification. It is certainly a triumph to [Lemargue ?] & [Manquin ?], whose Speeches in the Moniteur & the address I have looked at, & I find that they warn the Ministers "que ce ne [?] pas les Places elevees contre la France qui seront detruites, mais les notres, oui les notres." Sebastiani acknowledges that the demolition or preservation of these places signifies really very little in a military point of view, but it is the impression which he apprehends will prevail that Belgium is not an independent neutral State but a Kingdom subjected to the Control of other powers, & continued as a Rampart against France. Harassed as the Ministers are on every side, you must make some allowance for a little Soreness, when any Measure is adopted by the allies which increases their parliamentary difficulties, & opens on them a new Battery from the Press.

(Last para. on affairs of Greece.)

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/248

Paris

Dec 17th 1831

(Short Letter to a Mr Backhome (?) about copy of ratification of unspecified Treaty.)

Dec 19th 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I received late on Saturday night your Letter of the 15th communicating to me the signature of the Fortress Convention, & describing the agitation & uneasiness of Talleyrand upon being informed of its contents. My despatch of Friday will have prepared you for hearing from me that it is not so easy as you seem to have imagined to persuade Sebastiani & Perier to take the view which you recommend of the substitution of Marienberg & Phillippeville for Charleroi & Tournay. That they would have acted wisely in listening to that Recommendation, I fully admit, but I am sorry to say that I found Perier yesterday morning, when I went to him to talk over the question, entirely concurring in the objections to the Treaty which I had previously heard from Sebastiani, though more courteous in his Mode of stating them.

He complained very much of the concealment from Talleyrand of the Negotiation with Goblet; he said that when the object of this Govt had been not to look with a narrow view to the Separate Interests of France, but to the maintenance of social order, & of the general tranquillity, instead of discussing amicably & confidentially, to what degree his administration, & the Government of Louis Philippe might be embarrassed or affected by an arrangement, which might be represented as at variance with the previous declaration of the French Govt relative to the demolition of Fortresses constructed by the allies, we had disregarded all consideration of that Embarrassment, & treated them with distrust & suspicion. I assured him that neither the English Govt nor any of the allies were disposed to adopt a course of Proceeding which might be inconvenient, or embarrassing to his Govt, that I was persuaded if it were represented to the Chamber & the Publick that the destruction of these two places was an advantage to France, that they were so situated as to be capable of interrupting the communications between their own Fortresses within the French Frontier, no clamour would be raised against the arrangement; but if they protested against it, they would create that embarrassment, which they wished to avert. Cas, Perier answered with some petulance of manner, that he would not be the Person to make such a Representation. He said that the feeling & opinion of all his Colleagues had been unanimous on the Question. As Perier is somewhat

of an impatient eager temper, & as Sebastiani is quick & fiery & important, I thought I would try what could be done with Louis Philippe, & I therefore went last night to the Tuilleries; I found the Queen & her Sister in law almost alone, & they immediately sent to tell the King of my visit, but I waited until I had exhausted every topic of conversation with the Queen, & His Majesty came not; & it is evident that he avoided seeing me. Of my conversation with Sebastiani this morning you have my Report in my publick despatch. The Point of Leopold being bound by his declaration not to make any other Selection of Fortresses to be demolished than those mentioned in it is given up by Sebastiani as well as Perier, & they both have declared they would have been contented that Charleroi should have continued fortified, though as a Point of offensive operation against France, it is more important than Mons.

I wish this Ratification from Russia would arrive; Perier harped upon its non-arrival, as it made the Fortress Treaty more difficult to digest. This squabble between us will be [?] to the King of Holland, & he may perhaps think that the ill treatment of his Dutch officer by the Belgians is a nice pretext for beginning Hostilities & lighting up a general war in Europe.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/250

Paris

Dec 21 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I fear that this difference with the French Govt will turn out more seriously than the many others which occurred in the commencement of our negotiations about Belgium. I learn from more than one quarter that the Language of all the Ministers is very resolute on this Point of the Fortress Treaty, & that those who are anxious for the preservation of Peace, are much alarmed; I do not apprehend immediate Hostilities, but I fear the whole Belgian Question being kept for a long time in Suspense, & the Ministry here being upset by the difficulties they have brought upon themselves, by their inconsiderate opposition to the Fortress Convention.

Yours very sincerely

Granville.

Dec 23rd 1831

My dear Palmerston,

I see by the Newspapers that you were at Brighton, when the Bag of Tuesday last left the Foreign Office, which accounts for my not hearing from you the view you take of this determined opposition of the French Govt to the Fortress Treaty; the Ministers have acted most unwisely for themselves for their King, & for their Country, in raising up this wall to knock their heads against, but I see no symptom of their retracing their steps, & indeed they have now so committed themselves that it is not easy for them to retract; & how can we who have only acted upon the Principle we have uniformly asserted, make any Concession which will help them out of their Scrape. I say their Scrape, but it is in fact a Scrape for all the Powers to get into a Quarrel, not upon a point of practical importance, not a case of aggression or Injury, but on a principle which though perfectly intelligible to Statesmen & Publicists, will not excite any popular Enthusiasm in favour of war.

The present Ministers will not, I think go to war, but failing to give to the Country that assurance of Peace, which they had taught the public to expect would be the Result of their foreign Policy, they will, I fear give up their offices. The shuffling of the Emperor of Russia about Ratifying the Quintuple Treaty with Belgium has tended to irritate Casimir Perier. When Pozzo told him last night of his being authorised to sign the disarming convention, he answered testily, [c'est la Moutarde apris desir ?].

(Para. about Sebastiani's domestic affairs.)

Belliard arrived this morning from Brussels; & it is only since his arrival that this notion has been started of Leopold having no Right to sign the Fortress Treaty, & that it may be made matter of accusation against the Minis-^{ters} ^{his}. It would seem that the French will try to excite a parliamentary opposition to any foreign control over Belgian Fortresses.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/252

Paris

Dec 26 1831

My dear Palmerston,

(First part deals with possibility of Sebastiani being superseded.)

I think Pozzo is not without Hopes that the Duc de [Mortemort ?] may be appointed, he tried to enlist me in his Interests, by relating a conversation he had with him relative to the objection taken by the French Govt to the Fortress Treaty. The Duc de [Mortemort ?] differed on the point with Sebastiani & Perier, & promised to use his best efforts with the latter not to persevere in a dispute with us on a Question of no real practical importance to either Party. Werther, who, as I have told you, is always very pacifist is very unhappy at our Belgick Fortress Squabble, & not at all pleased with the Refusal of the E. of Russia to ratify the Quintuple Treaty with Leopold; it may be indifferent, he says, to Russia, which is situated at a distance from the scene of agitation, whether the Belgians & Dutch Question be speedily settled or kept some time longer in Suspense; the Emperor Nicholas may indulge his own personal feelings towards his sister the Princess of Orange, & the Interests of his Empire not be thereby materially affected, but the King of Prussia, though as nearly connected with the Queen of the Netherlands, as the Emperor with the Princess of Orange is precluded from acting upon personal feeling, by the deep Interest which his subjects have in terminating that State of [feverish ?] uncertainty as to war, which must continue until the Settlement of the affairs of Holland & Belgium.

Yours ever sincerely

Granville.

GC/GR/253

Paris

Dec 26th 1831

(Short Note about instructions to Captains of vessels re, the Slave Trade.)

Ref.: GC/GR 188 (continued)

Belgians would not be a member of the confederation, I objected to either being declared to be questions already settled, before any arrangements had been agreed upon with the Belgian Gov.. I told him that it would do mischief in Belgium, that it would be offensive to the Germanick diet, and displease other powers. But the ministers have been so (tunilled?) by the opponents of pusillanimity and their want of influence in European affairs have been in theme of such constant reproach to his that they thought to redress themselves with the public by the decisive and dictatorial tone of the paragraphs. But they will find that though the immediate impression in the chambers particularly as regards the demolition^{of} the forts was favourable to them, in the end they will only be the more embarrassed. You will have already seen the observations of the Belge Monitor upon this attack on the independence of the Belgian Gov.

As I shall have to write by the ordinary messenger tomorrow, I will not delay sending back your special courier. I shall endeavour to see Perier and Seb. tomorrow morning but as the review of all the National Guards and all the troops of the line begins at 8.00 tomorrow morning, and does not end till 6.00 in the evening I may fail to do so. I have to talk to the minister of the delay in giving credentials to Belliard, and in receiving those which Le Han(?) had brought from Leopold.

It seems by the convention with Russia(?) that the French fleet are to quit the Tegus as soon as the articles of the treaty are carried into execution.

Granville.