

GC/HE/121

St Petersburg
Dec 20 1830.

(Letter dealing with Russo-Polish affairs.)

GC/HE/122

St Petersburg
Feb 16 1831

(Lord Heytesbury requests leave of absence or permission to retire upon a pension.)

GC/HE/123

St Petersburg
May 1 1831

(Concerning progress of the Polish War.)

GC/HE/124

St Petersburg
May 2 1831

(Short Letter referring to the Polish War.)

GC/HE/125

St Petersburg
May 9 1831

(More about Russia and the Polish War.)

GC/HE/126

St Petersburg
May 31 1831

(Concerning Anglo-Russian relations.)

GC/HE/127

St Petersburg
June 30 1831

(Short Letter giving news of the death of Grand Duke
Constantine.)

GC/HE/128

St Petersburg
July 5 1831

(Heytesbury renews his application for leave of absence.)

GC/HE/129

St Petersburg
Aug 30 1831

(Further request to retire on pension.)

GC/HE/130

St Petersburg
Oct 8 1831

(Concerning internal affairs.)

GC/HE/131

St Petersburg
Nov 6 1831

(Deals mostly with Russian Amnesty in respect of Polish
insurgents.)

⁷
or "Court"
The [Court] has communicated to me the "Projet de Traité"
agreed upon in the Conference in London, but he declined
expressing any opinion with respect to its provisions till
he had received the Emperor's orders.

I have the honour to be
My dear Lord Palmerston
very truly & faithfully
Yrs

Heytesbury.

GC/HE/132

St Petersburg
Dec 17 1831

(Deals with the Czar and Russian politics.)

GC/HE/133

St Petersburg
Dec 18 1831

(Conduct and feelings of the Czar with respect to the Poles.)

GC/HE/146

London
Dec 31 1830

My dear Lord,

(First part of letter deals with new Greek frontier, and Poland.)

I much fear there is no chance of persuading the Belgians to accept the Prince of Orange, & unless they took him willingly & unanimously, his Election would only end in union with France.

I fear too his personal character; his known weakness & fickleness; his proneness to be governed by unworthy Favourites; & the suspicions, however unfounded they may be, which have been entertained of his private character by his Dutch & Belgian Subjects. All these things inspire with sad misgivings as to the permanence of any order of things at the Head of which he should be placed, in a Country just created out of the fermentation of Revolution.

I suspect that Leopold, marrying a French Princess, would be the best and perhaps the only practicable arrangement. This notion has originated at Brussels, is a favourite plan of Van der Weyer's, who is coming over here, & is much

GC/HE/146

approved in Paris. We have no particular interest in any arrangement, except that it should offer a prospect of stability & permanence. The Prince of Orange would in many respects be the best, & in some respects the worst choice, excepting always Nemours, Leuchtenberg & Reichstadt. I trust however that the Emperor will give Lieven discretion to act in this matter according to his judgement; for Events proceed at so rapid a pace now-a-days that Instructions received here at St Petersburg founded upon the last accounts received there from hence, must necessarily be a month or six weeks old; & in that interval matters may have so entirely altered, as to render these instructions totally inapplicable.

My dear Lord,

Yrs very faithfully,

Palmerston.

GC/HE/147

Foreign Office
March 22 1831

(Concerns Russia and Poland.)

GC/HE/148

For. Off.
22 March 1831

(Concerning Russia, Polish Revolt, & the Treaty of Vienna.)

GC/HE/149

For. Office
19 April 1831

(Russia & Polish Revolt.)

3 May 1831

My dear Lord Heytesbury,

(First part deals with Russia.)

The course of the Belgian Discussions which have been the Matters that have occupied our Attention the most has been indeed calculated necessarily to throw England into intimate Union with Russia, Austria & Prussia & to place those Four ~~XXXX~~ Powers in a state of Separation from France & ever & anon we have been expecting that the Conferences would break up leaving four on one side & one on the other. Pray therefore assure Ct[Nessel . . ?] that we know and understand the Honesty and Good Faith of the Russian Cabinet and that we do not set less Value upon those Qualities after our experience of some months of the other kinds of Qualities unfortunately displayed by the Govt of France; that we esteem & respect Russia & are most anxious to keep on good Terms with her.

(Paras. re. Poland, & French intrigue at Constantinople.)

P. Leopold has not or had not two days ago given a final answer to the Deputation sent to offer him the Crown of Belgium. His Inclination is not to accept unless the Belgians will agree to the Limits between Belgium & Holland. The Luxembourg Question being one between the Confederation & the Belgians rather than between the Conference & the Belgians might stand over for Separate Decision; and if any arrangement could be made between the Belgians & the King of the Netherlands on this Subject it would certainly be desirable.

I should think that if the King could get for Luxembourg an annual Sum equal to that which he settled upon P. Fredk in Exchange for the Inheritance of Luxembourg & also such a Portion of Limburg as would connect Maestricht solidly with Holland it would be a very good Bargain for all parties. Luxembourg would in that Case still remain attached to the Germanic Confederation. Holland would have two good & well defended Wings, the Dutch Flanders & Maestricht & the King's family would get as much Income as Luxenbourg would probably furnish; Belgium would be much stronger & less dependent on France to whom she always would be looking to give her Luxembourg in case of War; and she would be brought

into Connection with the Germanic Confederation which would be desirable.

There would be difficulties perhaps in bringing the King of the Netherlands to agree to this, but after all how is he to get back Luxembourg or to keep it afterwards.

The Confederation will not march their Troops at their own expense & can or will Holland vote money for such an Expedition, besides the large Army they already have in pay, when even as it is they can scarcely raise the Money necessary for their Services.

The Elections are all going in favour of Ministers & Reform; I do not know whether Cambridge may be an Exception but the Day after Tomorrow will decide that Question. But we shall be the Exception and not the Rule if the Decision is adverse.

My dear Lord Heytesbury

Yrs sincerely

Palmerston.

F.O.

August 26 1831

My dear Lord Heytesbury,

I send you a Collection of despatches which you ought to have in your possession. The French are at last moving out of Belgium in conformity with the pledge of their Government. They certainly have acted with perfect good faith and honour under circumstances of some temptation. But the union of the other Four Powers, the firm language held to them, and the public feeling manifested in this Country, would have prevented them from swerving even if they had had any intention to do so.

We must now make peace between Holland and Belgium as fast as we can, and in adjusting the terms we must discard all personal considerations, and look only to justice and the general interests of Europe. It is to be hoped that the Russian Government will not render our task more difficult

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than it need be, by an undue desire to push the personal interests and views of the King of the Netherlands.

The conduct of the Dutch Government in breaking out into hostilities at the time and in the manner it chose to do so, entitles it to no favour, but on the contrary would justly expose it to additional Sacrifices as a punishment for having done its utmost to bring on a general war, for that was plainly and almost avowedly its object. But we must not injure ourselves to punish this wrong-headed old man, and we should be doing so if we were to overlook the permanent interests of Holland as an element in the balance of Power. Luxembourg (I mean the Grand Duchy) must belong to Belgium, the Fortress continuing to remain with the Confederation, but Maestricht on the other hand must be Dutch. It would greatly facilitate all our arrangements if Russia would acknowledge King Leopold, and there cannot now be any good reason why she should not. There is now no longer any possibility of the House of Orange returning to Belgium. If Leopold were not to be King, Louis Philippe would. Russia would not therefore be sacrificing any real Dutch interests by the acknowledgement, and on the other hand, She would give us great facilities in Belgium by doing so. Pray urge this, and see what you can do with [Nesselrode?]. I am glad to hear the Cholera is abating, and hope that by the time you receive this, it will have ceased entirely. We are anxious for accounts from Poland. The next news must acquaint us with decisive events.

(Rest of Letter about Poland & Russia.)

My dear Lord Heytesbury,
Yours sincerely
Palmerston.

GC/HE/152

Foreign Office
Sept 21 1831

(Concerning Greece & Poland.)

GC/HE/153

Foreign Office
23 Nov 1831

(Concerning Russia & Poland.)

GC/CH/3

Berlin
12 January 1831

My Lord,

As I have an opportunity of sending this letter by a safe conveyance to the Hague from whence Sir Charles Bagot will forward it by his Messenger to England I take this occasion to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Private letter of the 31st Dec & to mention some points which I omitted purposely in my Dispatch No.18 on the subject of the reported Polish Deputation.

(Rest of Letter deals with Polish Question.)

I have the honour to be with the greatest Respect,
My Lord, your Lordship's
obedient Sevt.

G.W.Chad.

GC/CH/4

Berlin
22 March 1831

(Short Note referring to origin of some information about Poland.)

GC/CH/5

Berlin
18 May 1831

(Letter dealing with Russia & the suppression of the Polish Revolt.)

GC/CH/6

Berlin
26 May 1831

(Very short Note referring to Baron Werther not accepting Post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.)

8 June 1831

My Lord,

My illness having for a long time prevented me from seeing Count Bernstorff my first visit yesterday on being allowed to go out was to him.

As he is no longer ostensibly connected with the Foreign Office & as I had heard that he was angry with one of my Colleagues for insinuating that he would continue to have a share in that Department, I did not intend to speak to him at all upon Publick Affairs. Our Conversation however very soon naturally diverged into questions of Politicks. I am perhaps wrong in repeating to your Lordship what passed, but although Count Bernstorff is no longer in official Communication with the foreign Ministers his opinions have such weight here that upon the whole I think it best, as I have an opportunity of sending this letter by a safe hand, to state thus privately to your Lordship the substance of what he said.

He observed that he did not like Lord Ponsonby's letter, because it was not entirely in accordance with the language of the Conference; but he added that Lord Ponsonby fully sensible of the almost unsurmountable difficulties of the question was evidently impelled by the laudable desire of bringing it if possible to a settlement & of preventing an Explosion. "As to the Conference" he ~~xxx~~ continued "I do not complain of it, because I think it is almost a miracle that it has kept together so long."

He then mentioned Baron Buelow's sense of the flattering Confidence with which your Lordship treats him, & added "it appears that M. de Talleyrand & Lord Palmerston have in conversation with Baron Buelow touched upon the possibility of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg being entirely separated from the Confederation, in the event of its being left to Belgium by arrangement, & with the consent of his Dutch Majesty. The fortress of course remaining to the Confederation."

"He," continued Count Bernstorff "would consent to such an arrangement in the case supposed very willingly. We should like it much better than to see the Belgians in the Confederation, where they would only bring Interests opposed to those of Germany."

Referring again to Lord Ponsonby's letter he said "it embarrasses us with respect to the King of the Netherlands." I observed that the Belgians far from accepting it, were

GC/CH/11

Berlin

31 August 1831

My Lord,

Mr Ancillon told me in great Confidence this morning that France has been sounding Prussia and asking her support in an endeavour to get back Philippeville & Marienberg, offering in return to assist Prussia in respect to Maestricht, Venloo & Luxembourg.

To this overture M.de Werther replied that Meastricht, Venloo & Luxembourg were points already settled.

Mr Ancillon begged me to request your Lordship not to let this proposal transpire, & he took this opportunity of enlarging upon the necessity of our remaining strictly united & of preventing France from succeeding in her efforts to divide us. He added many expressions of his satisfaction at the proposal of an Armistice having been made to Holland, which he said was the best method of depriving France of all pretext for remaining in Belgium. He mentioned that M. LeHon had applied to General Sebastiani to leave some French Troops in Belgium. This application he considered as having been made at the suggestion of France.

I have the honour to be
with the greatest Respect
My Lord your Lordship's
most obedient Servant

G.W.Chad.

GC/CH/12

Berlin

7 Nov 1831

(Short Letter about Polish surrender.)

GC/CH/13

Berlin

28 December 1831

My Lord,

I take advantage of the Passage of the Messenger Nixon thro' this place to write without reserve to you Lordship.

I at first suspected that Mr Ancillon represented the refusal of Russia to ratify the Belgian Treaty as more absolute & final than it really was in order to get rid of that Treaty & obtain by a modification of the 24 articles better terms for the King of Holland. Nothing however has since occurred to confirm this suspicion, & I believe I was mistaken.

Mr Ancillon however does not like the Belgian Treaty & he thinks that the Powers of Baron Buelow although very extensive, were not directed to the signature of such a Treaty & that if Prussia had thought fit to refuse to ratify it, she might have done so on that ground.

Count Bernstorff's retirement & ill health are much to be regretted. He is impracticable it is true upon some points, but he takes a large & statesmanlike view of affairs, & being thoroughly convinced that it is necessary for Prussia to avoid war, he would not compromise this great object for the sake of catching at little incidental advantages. His opinion had great weight with the King, & the frankness of his Character, the straightforward manner in which he transacted business were a real comfort to those who had to treat with him.

Since I wrote my private letter to your Lordship by Mr Tupper I learn from my Banker that the King has still without assembling States General, the resource of borrowing back the money already paid towards the discharge of the debt, which would give him about 12 millions of Thalers (£1,800,00 stg) and also a Power which he reserved to himself of raising about 18 millions of Thalers (£2,700,000 stg) in case of any sudden Emergency.

Monied men here think that a want of Cash begins already to be felt at the Treasury, & it is whispered that the House of Rothschild have advanced 5 millions of Thalers (£750,000 stg) to the King upon his Majesty's Private Security & that this Sum was immediately applied to the public Service. I cannot rely upon the exactness of this Statement, but it is not thought improbable by People conversant with affairs here, & that the Story should meet with any degree of credit with such Persons is a Proof of their opinion of the State of the Treasury.

I am convinced that the King & the Government feel that a war, & especially a war of Principles would be attended by the most awful risk, & I think that if anything is to be obtained from them it must be by acting upon this fear of war. Mr Ancillon's words to me on the Russian non ratification

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of the Belgian Treaty were "Je tremble de recevoir des nouvelles de Londres, je [craises ?] des mesures violentes."

The Ultra monarchical Party here however think there is no fear of War at present; a Person in the Confidence of one of the Princes said to me lately speaking of what the King of Holland has to apprehend "France cannot make War. War would be the death of the Orleans Dynasty; & you are too much engrossed with your home affairs to draw the sword at present.

I have the honour to be
with the greatest Respect

My Lord

Your Lordship's faithful Servant

G.W.Chad.

(A few lines follow about the Portuguese Question.)

GC/CH/14

Nov 28 1831

(Extracts from L'Article II et III de l'Ordonance du
17 Janvier 1820 in French without accompanying Letter
& pre-dated as above.)

GC/CH/32

London

December 31 1830

My dear Sir,

I fear it will be found impossible to reconcile the Belgians to the Prince of Orange; but we shall do all that may be possible to effect it; should that fail the next best chance that occurs to us is the Prince Leopold marrying a French Princess. I mention this to you that you may know how to guide yourself; we have however as yet taken no steps separate from the Ministers of our Allies on this subject, nor do we mean to do so: our only wish and interest is to make such an arrangement as may be likely to last, and to keep Belgium from becoming French; and it is much to be feared that for many reasons the Prince of Orange would hardly fulfil these conditions.

My dear Sir,
Yrs

Palmerston.

GC/CH/33

Cambridge

May 3 1831

(The Polish question as it concerned Russia, Prussia, Austria & France.)

GC/CH/34

For. Office

20 May 1831

(Letter informing Chad that the Count de Flahault had been appointed French Ambassador in Berlin, & appraisal of his character.)

Aug 19 1831

My dear Sir,

I have received your Communication informing me of the Instruction sent to Baron Buelow to protect the Interests of the King of the Netherlands in the Event of any Attempt being made by the Conference to impose Penalties upon him for his violation of the Armistice and I have already perceived in Buelow's Tone & Language the effect of these Instructions. Pray tell Mr Anwillon that the English Govt do not wish to revenge upon Holland the Misconduct of her King. We think the Proceeding of King William unjustifiable, it was a breach of Engagement, an affront to the Five Powers and a deliberate Attempt to kindle a general War in Europe. In hopes of being able to profit by the Confusion. The King has therefore lost in a great degree whatever Claims he might have founded upon Personal Considerations and having tried to make a Disturbance & having failed he could not justly complain if he was punished by Fine & the Stocks. But in settling the Separation of Belgium & Holland we must not think merely of punishing riotous Old Man. We must consider the Peace and Security of Europe and the only use which ought to be made of his folly is to force him to agree to such Terms as may be thought by the Allies just & reasonable between him & Belgium. The recent Events indeed give us a Right to hold a more decided Language to both Parties. To Holland, because she has put herself in the wrong and has failed in her Attempt, to Belgium because she has shown her vauntings were Empty boasting and that she cannot at present defend herself. We ought to propose forthwith a Definition Treaty without much consulting either Party and which both Parties should be required to agree to. It should be founded upon the two Series of Articles, which whatever may have been said at Brussels and the Hague are substantially and in their Principles the same. Holland should be what it was in 1790 except that recent Events have shown that Maestricht ought to be entirely Dutch, and when it is Dutch, it is to be hoped that there will always be a Prussian Force ready to garrison it in Time of Need; for we should greatly deceive ourselves if we estimated the permanent Military Character and Resources of Holland from the Spirit of this bit of a Campaign.

Luxembourg, that is the Duchy, must be Belgian, but some Arrangement must be made for preserving the Fortress to the Confederation. The Belgians ought to give in Exchange for

Luxembourg the upper end of Limburg, down to about [Roermonde ?] and all the Dutch Enclaves should be thrown together & thus Holland should have the whole of the Right Bank of the Meuse so as to give Communication with Maestricht. Perhaps some small money Payment might be asked for Luxembourg in addition to these Territorial arrangements, though that is doubtful because in Fact the King of the Netherlands has by this last Break out irrecoverably lost Luxembourg and never would be able to regain Possession of that Duchy. The Belgians can have no claim to [?] & the other little Bits bought by Holland in 1800 nor the Dutch to the light [cantons ?] of Philippeville & Marienberg added to the Netherlands in 1815.

The Debt ought to be divided by giving each their original Portion and dividing the joint Debt which is not much in a fair Ratio, but Holland cannot claim from Belgium what she calls Indemnities for the Sacrifices made to acquire Belgium. Whatever she paid for Belgium, she got Belgium in Return and it was her business to keep it, and if she could not keep it, so much the worse for her, but she cannot expect to have back again the Price she paid 15 years ago. Transactions are closed when they are completed and cannot be ripped open again in this Manner in Consequence of Subsequent Events.

I sincerely hope the Prussian Government will not press their personal Protection of the King of the Netherlands in a way that would produce Separation among the Allies and drive England to unite herself with France in espousing the Counter Pretensions of the Belgians. We are & ought to be Mediators & not Partizans but if some of us adopt the latter character the Example must of course become catching.

(Last para. about conduct of Prussian Govt to holders of English Passports & complaints concerning.)

My dear Sir

Yrs sincerely

Palmerston.

August 26 1831

My dear Sir,

(First para. deals with Poland, & the matter of English passports & transit of goods in Prussia.)

One point however upon which I wish you to urge them very much is the recognition of Leopold as King of Belgium. There certainly was an implied understanding between him and the Members of the Conference before he went, that if the Belgians accepted the 18 Articles, the difficulties which prevented his acceptance of the Crown would be removed; these difficulties being that he would not accept without being sure of being acknowledged. He and the Belgians have done all that depended upon them to execute the wishes of the Conference, and it is highly unjust that the refusal of the Dutch over whom he can have no control, should deprive him of that which he was led to expect as the result of the acceptance of the 18 Articles by the Belgians. Prussia moreover can gain nothing for the Dutch King by withholding her acknowledgement of Leopold. The restitution of the Nassaus in Belgium is out of the question. The choice is between Leopold and Louis Philippe. The acknowledgement by Prussia then would sacrifice nothing for the Nassaus, but would on the other hand afford us many facilities with reference to our negotiation between the two parties. The Dutch think that by prevailing on Prussia and Russia to withhold their acknowledgement till the King of the Netherlands is satisfied they shall get better terms from the Belgians. But in this they are mistaken. On the contrary by keeping up animosities and inspiring doubts, they add to the obstinacy of the Belgians and throw them into the arms of France; while France and England also find themselves forced to take the Belgians under their especial protection, and to set themselves against the Dutch in order by this means to bring back to a level the balance deranged by Russian and Prussian partiality for the Dutch King. Pray press this matter earnestly with M. Ancillon, and see if you cannot prevail upon him to recognize Leopold handsomely and at once.

Yours sincerely

Palmerston.

P.S. Abercrombie will go out to you next week.

GC/CH/37

Foreign Office

21 Sept 1831

(Refers to the conclusion of the Russo-Polish War.)

GC/CH/38

Foreign Office

Nov 23 1831

(First para. refers to Prussia & Russia.)

I conclude that the Treaty with Belgium has by this time been received at Berlin; I trust there can be no doubt of its being Ratified, but pray explain to the Prussian [sic] that an early Ratification would be a great Point, and that they would produce a very salutary effect both in Belgium and Holland if they exchanged their Ratifications immediately and would either send a Minister to Brussels, or receive one from thence. The nearness of Berlin to Brussels enables the Prussian Govt to take the lead in this step, and I am convinced that such a measure would have a powerful Effect upon the Determination of the King of the Netherlands. Sir Robert Adair represents to me very strongly how much the arrival of a Prussian Minister would lead to more Confidence and confirm tranquillity at Brussels.

Yrs sincerely

Palmerston.

GC/CH/39

Foreign Office

Dec 3 1831

(Letter dealing with situation in Portugal & relations of Britain thereto.)

Dec 30 1831

My dear Sir,

I never was much more surprised than I was at the Receipt of your last Despatches informing me that upon the first Rumour of the refusal of the Emperor Nicholas to ratify the Treaty M. Ancillon was proposing to eat up all his words and to back out of all his Engagements about Belgium. He certainly has a difficult task to perform in this Respect, and would deserve some Applause if he could acquit himself with decent Success, but what he has undertaken is beyond the Powers of Man, for no human ingenuity could invent a plausible Pretence upon which Prussia could now refuse to ratify the Belgian Treaty.

I know not who furnished M. Ancillon with his new [Dictum ?] about [Treaties ?], nor whether he gave it to some from whom we have heard it in this Town within the last Four or Five days or whether they suggested it to him, but the Proposition is untenable let who may be its author.

The first Sentiment it produced was extreme Indignation, the next a Feeling not so nearly balanced with Respect. You are authorised to communicate to M. Ancillon the whole of my Dispatch & it is even desirable that you should; and if he wishes it you may even leave him a Copy of it. You will tell him that Parliament meets on the 17th Jan, that it is absolutely necessary we should be able on that day to inform the two houses how we stand with our Allies in respect to the Ratification of the Treaty, the Signature of which was announced in the Speech from the throne at the opening of the Session; England cannot refuse to ratify. There is no [pleading him?] that Instructions have been contravened or Powers overstepped & it is only upon those grounds that an honourable Govt can refuse to notify a Treaty.

Notwithstanding the little Breeze we have had about the Fortresses, I have no doubt whatever that France will ratify also. England, France & Belgium then will have to carry into execution the Stipulations of the Treaty.

What will Prussia do? Will she oppose them and range herself under the Banner of Holland to prevent the execution of an Arrangement which she has pronounced to be Equitable & just and which she has even promised to Ratify. This is not very probable.

Will she stand by then an inactive Spectator and incur all the odium of broken Faith without any advantage to the Party, in whose Behalf she would have violated her Engagements? These are Questions which M. Ancillon ought seriously to consider because they will very shortly force themselves

upon him.

I see nothing that can prevent a War except the Ratification of the Treaty. If Prussia refuses, one or other of two things will be demonstrated; either that in spite of her Pacific Professions, Prussia is panting for War; or else that she is not an independent Agent and is dragged by Russia at her Chariot Wheels. You must insist upon having an immediate Answer, Yes or No, Will Prussia ratify or not & it should be given in a Prussian Note in Order that it may be produced, if it should ever become necessary to do so, if the Papers are laid before Parliament, which upon all occasions of unsuccessful Negotiations they invariably are.

As the Time is barely long enough to admit of a Courier going & returning, I have settled with Talleyrand, that in a Matter of Common Interest to France & England we shall have the use of the French Telegraph Strasburg through Paris to Calais. Talleyrand writes to Bresson to desire him to communicate with you & tell you how it is to be done, but I imagine that you will send to Strasburg a short Message such as a Telegraph can readily [?] such as "Prussia Ratifies immediately." Your Dispatch will come in the usual Way but the Telegraph Message will probably reach London some days before your Courier.

You will not keep your Courier till you can say that Prussia has her Ratification made out, but get a short Note stating in writing her Intention & send off your Messenger as soon as you get it.

We are preparing an Answer to the long Note of the Dutch Plenipotentiaries and I have no doubt of our being able successfully to refute all their Assertions.

(Last short para. concerns Poland.)

My dear Sir,

Yours sincerely

Palmerston.

GC/BE/5

Feb 1829

(Memo on Portuguese affairs.)

GC/BE/6

1830.

Dear Palmerston,

I have answered my [Man ?] declining to make the enquiry he wishes for, and inculcating the cautions you recommend. I mention this that you may be at your [ease ?].

I don't see how that Belgian affair is to be settled without blows, and that [stirring ?] aspect of the times reconciles me to Vienna; for your perseverance in which I am really most grateful to you. Every thing may do well, even the Polish affair, if those damned Belgians can but be managed: what I fear the most as being most imminent, is their coming to blows among themselves.

Yrs

F. Lamb.

GC/BE/7

Undated.

(Short Note about reported revolution at Parma.)

GC/BE/8

Brighton, Sunday.

(Short Letter referring to stay at the Royal Pavilion, where King was warm in praise of Palmerston.)

GC/BE/9

1831

(Short Note listing new French Ministry & concluding that "the principle of the Ministry is peace, the King not to [preach ?] at the Council. He has shown more firmness than usual.")

Dear Palmerston,

(First para. about Piedmont.)

I had some talk yesterday with Sir George Murray who says the cheapest and only effective way of pacifying Ireland is by paying the Catholic Church. In such a case you would want the Pope dealt with also.

Yrs

F.Lamb.

GC/BE/11

13 March 1831

Dear Palmerston,

I have letters from the Palais Royal by which it appears that Casimir Perrier demands two points before taking office. 1st that the King shall cease to [assist ?] at the Councils, that He shall reign, and not govern. 2nd that the word intervention shall be explained. His [?] of it being that France is not called upon to take part in what happens all over Europe, and that Austria shall be at liberty to tranquillise Italy. The apprehension of Russian interference is made use of against him, and if any even unofficial assurance could be given of support to France in case of an unjust attack upon her by the Allies it would give much force to Casimir and probably determine the conduct of the King. Sebastiani and Lafitte had offered their resignations, much disturbance in Paris, and a probability of the Ministry not being settled for some days.

Yrs

F.Lamb.

GC/BE/12

17 March 1831

Dear Palmerston,

Casimir Perrier is taking fright at the intentions of the Allies, and is apprehensive if he separ-

GC/BE/12

ated entirely from the parti du mouvement of finding afterwards that he has been taken in and is exposed to attack from the Alliance. Your message I hope will do good, but it would add to it if the others of the Conference here would send assurances of the friendly disposition of their [?] in case he restored order in France and behaves fairly in foreign affairs. What do you say to [... .. ?]. I shall have no opinion of that Belgic business until you can announce a joint occupation of the territory and be prepared to execute it.

Yrs

F. Lamb.

GC/BE/13

1831

Dear Palmerston,

Talleyrand showed me last night the dispatch he had got about the Protocols, which he is anxious to have considered as not breaking off the negotiation, but as open to further discussion. I have no doubt of your considering it so when he communicated - but what is perhaps better worth your knowing is that he is in a quandary about having always represented that the only way for France to arrive at the alliance which above all things she covets with this country, is to adopt the principle of the English Government that of conservation. Now this reform he regards as dans le mouvement and that he shall be looked upon as a [hope ?] or a deceiver in having misrepresented the nature of the English Govt, which may lead not only to upsetting the little credit he has at home, but to a different course of measures on the part of ~~the~~ his Govt. As he sees the Tories a good deal at Ldy Jersey these notions will be aggravated by them, and hence in my mind the necessity for inculcating both upon him and at Paris that you have no intention of mouvement, and reform is but another and more efficient means of conservation.

dupe?

Yrs

F. Lamb.

GC/CH/7

outrageous, & I added that at all events the letter fortified our case against a People who could be so unreasonable as to reject it.

(Ensuing passage refers to Russia, Prussia & Poland.)

I am still so far from being recovered, that it is with great difficulty I have got to the end of this Letter. I hope therefore that your Lordship will read it with Indulgence.

I have the honour to be with the greatest Respect,
My Lord,

Your Lordship's
obedient Servant

G.W.Chad.

GC/CH/8

Berlin
5 July 1831

(Short Note with reference to the possibility of Baron Buelow becoming Foreign Minister.)

GC/CH/9

Berlin
12 July 1831

(Letter reporting conversation with Count Bernstorff who discussed the Polish question as it affected Prussia, Russia & France, & insurrection in general.)

GC/CH/10

Berlin
3 August 1831

(Deals with Prussian neutrality in regard to Poland & the permissible use of the English language in diplomacy.)

GC/BE/15

who is gone there; so I do it for him. He looks upon this as the [?] which will determine War or peace, and founds his hopes of the latter upon your being able to gain Prussia, which he thinks will depend upon her being reassured by Belgium taking the Prince of Orange for its king. If this fails, he thinks Prussia will carry her point at Berlin. I am so much disposed to concur in this that I risk the boring of you with this note, as I do not feel sure that he had fully explained himself to you.

Yrs
F. Lamb

GC/BE/16

11 June 1831

Dear Palmerston,

I have letters from Paris which mention a great change in opinion there - not only a change of Ministry but a new revolution is feared on account of these Belgic affairs. Casimir Perrier is much alarmed, and the King is asked every where why they do not make war for Belgium, voila l'etat des choses let you on me be represented.

[?]

Yrs
F. Lamb.